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ABSTRACT 
With the increasing prevalence of and dependency on smartphones, it is critical to 
understand how the sensor data collected from their users is used and shared. This thesis 
investigates the homeland security risks associated with smartphone-sensor data 
collection and sharing. Publicly available technical specifications, open-source 
documents, and published studies were used to evaluate how smartphone data could be 
used to threaten the security of the homeland. This analysis reveals that smartphone 
sensor data, especially when aggregated, threatens the security of individuals and 
organizations at a level that also threatens homeland security. This analysis recommends 
specific actions that should be taken by individuals, organizations, and the homeland 
security enterprise to mitigate these threats. 
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According to a survey by the Pew Research Center, 77 percent of U.S. adults own 
a smartphone.1 Since most smartphone users are completely unaware of the sensors that 
are built into their phones, it is critical to evaluate the potential homeland security risks 
posed by the routine data collection and sharing inherent to the function of these 
smartphones.2 These risks go beyond the potential intelligence issues associated with 
knowing where people are and what they are doing, but also pose substantial data 
security issues.  
Smartphone sensors fall into four main categories: audio and visual, 
environmental, location, and biometric. Three major groups can access these sensors and 
the data they generate: manufacturers, telecommunication carriers, and third-party 
developers. Though manufacturers have requirements in place for app developers to limit 
data collection and request user permission to access certain sensors, this requirement 
does not extend to all sensors.3 Additionally, mobile web browsers are able to access 
smartphone sensor data without apps; no notice is required, and data collection may 
happen when the browser is minimized or when the smartphone has been locked.4 
User privacy and security concerns center around the possibility of smartphones 
recording them, tracking them, or stealing their personal data. The sensor datasets create 
a personalized black box that can retrace a user’s actions in great detail for an indefinite 
amount of time. Smartphones can provide insight into a users’ movements, relationships, 
health, fitness, employment, personal data, and more. As part of a larger group of users, 
datasets can also identify patterns of behavior and movement.  
                                                 
1 “Mobile Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, 2018, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. 
2 Maryam Mehrnezhad et al., “Stealing PINs via Mobile Sensors: Actual Risk versus User Perception,” 
International Journal of Information Security 17, no. 3 (June 2018): 300, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-
017-0369-x. 
3 Ming Liu, “A Study of Mobile Sensing Using Smartphones,” International Journal of Distributed 
Sensor Networks 9, no. 3 (March 10, 2013): 11, https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/272916.  
4 Mehrnezhad et al., “Stealing PINs via Mobile Sensors,” 291–92. 
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McKenna, Gaudion, and Evans identified the need to take a closer look at how 
data can be aggregated between multiple data sources, including smartphone sensors, 
social media, satellite data, and software to identify and address potential privacy and 
security risks.5 In their analysis, they identified this “across-device, across-platform, and 
multi-sourced data aggregation” as “the satellite-smart device information nexus,” which 
they state, “poses a threat to individual privacy, civil liberties, and national security.”6  
This thesis provides a framework to evaluate risk based on the type of risk 
involved, as well as the potential impact. The type of risk is broadly characterized into 
the scope of impact; that is, whether the impact will most likely affect an individual or an 
organization.  
With the increased use of smartphones in the workplace, both personal and 
company issued, employers face an increased threat that data aggregation from 
smartphone sensors will compromise their privacy and security. In the 2019 Verizon 
Mobile Security Index report, 67 percent of organizations surveyed indicated they were 
“less confident about the security of their mobile assets than other devices;” 80 percent 
indicated that mobile threats are growing faster; 48 percent stated that they “sacrificed 
security to ‘get the job done.’”7 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published a Study on Mobile 
Device Security in 2017. The report acknowledged the need to focus on developing 
policies and protocols for mobile device security, as “the default level of security is 
optimized for consumer ease of use, which is not appropriate for Federal employees.”8 
The 2019 Verizon Public Sector report indicates that 80 percent of the mobile breaches 
                                                 
5 Anne Toomey McKenna, Amy C. Gaudion, and Jenni L. Evans, “The Role of Satellites and Smart 
Devices: Data Surprises and Security, Privacy, and Regulatory Challenges,” Penn State Law Review 123, 
no. 591 (July 11, 2019): 591, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3418420. 
6 McKenna, Gaudion, and Evans, 595. 
7 “Verizon Mobile Security Index 2019,” Verizon, February 2019, https://enterprise.verizon.com/ 
resources/reports/mobile-security-index/.  
8 “DHS S&T Study on Mobile Device Security,” Department of Homeland Security, April 2017, 
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/mobile-device-security-study. 
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experienced by the public sector includes data loss.9 Additionally, the report shows that 
only 12 percent rated their employees as “highly knowledgeable in mobile security,” the 
lowest of all sectors.10  
Three main threat vectors relate to smartphone sensor data: data aggregation and 
predictive analytics, direct sensor access and control, and data theft or manipulation. 
Anonymized datasets are frequently published online for research and data mining 
purposes; however, by correlating the anonymized dataset with other publicly available 
datasets, user data can be linked to specific individuals. The ability of a bad actor to 
aggregate enough data to generate a complete dossier for a targeted individual or group is 
growing exponentially. Knowing the patterns and routines of homeland security 
enterprise (HSE) individuals or groups could compromise physical security. Intimate 
knowledge of an individual’s personal life can also lead to blackmail scenarios. By 
aggregating enough data, predictive analytics could be used to analyze user patterns and 
behavior to predict future behavior.  
As a result of data aggregation, malware, or targeted attacks, another threat vector 
relates to the undetected hijacking and direct control of smartphone sensors. By gaining 
control of these sensors, bad actors would have the ability to freely spy on users, 
gathering data on their communications, location, physical and cyber environments, and 
networks. This control presents a clear risk for the HSE, as highly sensitive data and 
networks then become accessible to bad actors. Smartphone sensor data scenarios rise to 
the level of a homeland security risk when the data can be used to impact national 
security. 
Data theft is one of the most common risks because of either or both previous 
vectors. Bad actors may target a variety of secure datasets they would otherwise be 
unable to access any other way. The DHS report indicates that government smartphones 
potentially provide a way to breach systems that house data on millions of Americans and 
other sensitive government information, with threats ranging from “advanced nation state 
                                                 




attacks, to organized crime using advanced fraud technologies, to simple theft of mobile 
phones.”11  
Based on the information covered in this thesis, it is apparent that smartphone 
sensor data, especially when aggregated, poses an increasing risk to not only individual 
and organizational privacy and security, but also homeland security. Individuals, 
organizations, and the HSE must evaluate their privacy and data security needs and take 
action to mitigate the risks. The following recommendations should be implemented for 
each defined user group. 
Individual Users: 
• Taking time to understand the capabilities of their smartphones better. By 
understanding what privacy and security options are available, users can 
modify their settings appropriately and make informed decisions on 
privacy and security.  
• Reading and understanding the terms and conditions of any downloaded 
applications.  
• Minimizing app downloads and refraining from downloading apps from 
unauthorized platforms. 
• Performing system updates regularly.  
Organizations: 
• Ensuring individual users are following the previous recommendations. 
• Ensuring the organization employs at least the minimum industry 
standards for mobile security. The four basic security policies are as 
follows: regularly testing security systems, restricting access on an as 
                                                 
11 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS S&T Study on Mobile Device Security.” 
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needed basis, changing default passwords, and encrypting sensitive data 
on public networks.12  
• Implementing data loss prevention (DLP) policies.  
• Participating in device enrollment programs (DEP).13  
• Employing anti-malware to prevent, identify, and eliminate malware on 
systems and devices.14  
Homeland Security Enterprise: 
• Ensuring recommendations are being followed by individual users and 
organizations. 
• Prioritizing mobile security over ease of use; for example, minimize or 
closely monitor bring your own device (BYOD) programs. 
• Providing DEP smartphones for employees as needed.  
• Drafting enhanced policy and regulations for stronger and more consistent 
acceptable use policies, data and rights management, and the identification 
of mobile device exclusion zones within secure or sensitive facilities. 
• Initiating a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
project on data anonymity. Modeled after the TOR, or the onion router, 
project, the DARPA initiative would focus on anonymizing smartphone 
usage.  
• Investing on improving its workforce’s knowledge of mobile security and 
cybersecurity. With the large number of public sector data breaches, it is 
                                                 
12 Verizon, “Verizon Mobile Security Index 2019.” 
13 “Explained: The Apple Device Enrollment Program (Apple DEP),” Simple MDM (blog), April 19, 
2019, https://simplemdm.com/definitive-guide-to-the-apple-device-enrollment-program-apple-dep/. 
14 Margaret Rouse, “What Is Antimalware (Anti-Malware)?,” SearchSecurity, December 2017, 
https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/antimalware. 
xx 
crucial that HSE employees have the knowledge and training needed to 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What types of data do smartphone sensors collect and how is it shared? Does the 
data or the way it is shared pose a potential homeland security threat? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2018, 77 percent 
of U.S. adults own a smartphone.1 In a 2015 study, the Pew Research Center found that 
90 percent of cellphone owners have their phone with them frequently and 76 percent 
rarely, or never, turn them off.2 With the increasing dependency on smartphones and their 
prevalence in everyday and professional use, it is critical to understand the type of sensor 
data they collect from their users and how that data is used and shared to understand the 
potential homeland security risks. Current smartphones have over a dozen built in sensors 
capable of collecting information about the user, including location data, sound, images, 
videos, biometrics, and how the phone is being used. Unlike applications, where users 
have control over downloading software, sensors are built into the phone and 
automatically collect certain types of data. Some of the data is used to support basic 
smartphone functions while other information is used for diagnostics or app functionality. 
In addition, apps and mobile websites also have the ability to access sensors; in some 
cases, without the user’s knowledge or consent. Most smartphone users are unaware of 
what sensors are built into their phones, what data they are collecting, and how that 
information is being shared, which can lead to data security issues.3  
                                                 
1 “Mobile Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, 2018, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. 
2 Lee Rainie and Kathryn Zickuhr, Americans’ Views on Mobile Etiquette (Washington, DC: Pew 
Research Center, 2015), 11, http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2015/08/2015-08-
26_mobile-etiquette_FINAL.pdf. 
3 Maryam Mehrnezhad et al., “Stealing PINs via Mobile Sensors: Actual Risk versus User Perception,” 
International Journal of Information Security 17, no. 3 (June 2018): 300, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-
017-0369-x. 
2 
The sheer amount of sensor data available from such a large portion of the 
population leaves the United States open to having vital information exposed or exploited 
by bad actors. While the loss of personal data and privacy is an issue that must be 
addressed, this thesis examines the gap in knowledge of what type of sensor data is being 
gathered, how it is used and shared, and whether any previous sensor data incidents have 
had a homeland security impact. The thesis also analyzes whether the future loss or 
misuse of that data may pose a homeland security risk and what kind impact it may have. 
The results of this analysis will assist homeland security officials in determining the level 
of risk posed by smartphone sensor data collection and whether mitigation efforts are 
needed.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
With the increase in dependency on smartphones and their increased prevalence, 
it becomes more and more critical to understand the type of sensor data being collected 
and shared and how that impacts privacy, as well as homeland security. With the growing 
number of privacy breaches that have been reported by the media, it has become apparent 
that users are not aware of how their data are being collected, shared, and used. In 
determining how data privacy should be addressed, the following questions must be 
reviewed: 
• How widespread is the smartphone data privacy issue? 
• Are there legitimate reasons for the data collection? 
• Are there negative implications for data collection? 
• What are the possible solutions? 
This literature review focuses on these smartphone data collection privacy 
questions. 
3 
1. How Widespread Is the Smartphone Data Privacy Issue? 
Smartphone usage has increased exponentially in the last few years, with the 
majority of the U.S. population owning smartphones that are on their person nearly all 
day. In 2018, the Pew Research Center found that 77 percent of U.S. adults own a 
smartphone.4 In an article studying how different generational groups view data privacy, 
Fleming and Adkins note that compared to the other groups, millennials had the highest 
level of trust that companies will keep their information private, with 44 percent 
indicating they trusted companies “most of the time.”5 The authors point out that as the 
first generation to grow up with the technology, millennials may consider data breaches 
and misuse an “unfortunate, but normal” course of events.6  
In their study, Dai et al. seem to confirm that smartphones are so embedded in 
daily life that users download and use applications on their smartphones despite data 
privacy risks.7 They discuss the practice of data over-collection, where apps collect more 
data than needed for the primary intended purpose. The study indicates that part of the 
problem lies in users not understanding the permissions they agree to during the 
download and installation process, which may allow apps to access sensor data without 
the user’s knowledge. Without clear visibility into all the data being collected, users may 
not be aware of how much information they are sharing. This information may include 
sensitive sensor data, such as location tracking, photos, and biometrics. According to the 
study, data over-collection is prevalent in many applications, with 93 percent of Apple 
Store apps and 89 percent of Google Play apps engaging in it.8 
                                                 
4 Pew Research Center, “Mobile Fact Sheet.” 
5 John Fleming and Amy Adkins, “Data Security: Not a Big Concern for Millennials,” Gallup, June 9, 
2016, https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/192401/data-security-not-big-concern-millennials.aspx. 
6 Fleming and Adkins. 
7 Wenyun Dai et al., “Who Moved My Data? Privacy Protection in Smartphones,” IEEE 
Communications Magazine 55, no. 1 (January 2017): 20–25, https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM. 
2017.1600349CM.  
8 Wenyun Dai et al., 20. 
4 
2. Are There Legitimate Reasons for Data Collection? 
Smartphones have more than a dozen onboard sensors that are used to run many 
basic applications, such as identifying the current location, updating the time to the 
correct time zone, and orienting the screen correctly in portrait or landscape mode. Most 
users find these functions to be invaluable and would have issues if they were 
unavailable. In a 2014 study, Su, Tong, and Ji identified three main groups of sensors: 
video, environmental, and wearable.9 Each sensor group plays a role in ensuring that 
smartphones function as expected.  
In addition, Su, Tong, and Ji analyzed the potential usefulness of smartphone 
sensor data in improving people’s daily lives. Specifically, they focused on activity 
recognition, which utilizes sensor data to predict motion activity.10 Their research 
suggests that applications can be created to improve both elderly and youth care by 
utilizing activity recognition. For example, their research pointed out that smartphones 
can detect falls, which could be connected to an application to alert medical personnel. 
Regarding youth care, their research indicated that activity sensors could be useful in 
tracking sleeping status. 
3. What Are the Negative Implications of Data Collection? 
In his book Data and Goliath, cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier discusses the 
potential negative consequences of data collection. While Schneier acknowledges that 
data is a “by-product of computing,” he indicates that ubiquitous data collection could be 
more accurately defined as data surveillance.11 He states that as governments and other 
entities gather more and more personal data, they have the ability to aggregate said data 
to make connections they normally would not be able to make. In one case, Cellan-Jones 
from the BBC reported on the fact that location data from fitness trackers revealed the 
location of sensitive military and intelligence installations across the globe by 
                                                 
9 Xing Su, Hanghang Tong, and Ping Ji, “Activity Recognition with Smartphone Sensors,” Tsinghua 
Science and Technology 19, no. 3 (June 2014): 235–49, https://doi.org/10.1109/TST.2014.6838194. 
10 Su, Tong, and Ji, 235–49. 
11 Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your 
World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015), 13–32. 
5 
aggregating multiple users’ jogging paths into a searchable heat map available online via 
Strava’s website.12 While the article states that Strava has since anonymized the data and 
excluded areas marked as privacy zones, the concern remains that additional security 
breaches may expose the data again.  
This type of high-profile privacy exposure is what Schneier feels builds a sense of 
paranoia among the general public. In his book, Schneier discusses how this paranoia 
may impact political liberty and justice, as individuals are discouraged from engaging in 
certain activities out of a fear that data collected about them could be used in a negative 
manner in the future.13 Specifically, he points out that data can be stored indefinitely, 
which can hold individuals accountable for actions that may no longer be relevant. 
Christopher Wylie shares Schneier’s concerns about mass data collection. In 
2013, he developed the methodology for using social data to create psychological profiles 
for political use, eventually founding Cambridge Analytica.14 Cambridge Analytica used 
an app on Facebook to collect data from users and anyone on their contact lists, which 
impacted 30 million to 87 million individuals. According to an article in Time magazine, 
these data were heavily used in creating the Republican strategy for the 2016 presidential 
election.15 In the same article, Wylie states in retrospect “his failure was not realizing the 
potential misuse of his research earlier.”16 
4. What Are the Possible Solutions? 
Despite the data privacy risks, users are accustomed to the convenience of 
integrating smartphones into their daily routines. Based on that convenience alone, it is 
unlikely the general public will abandon their usage; with the lucrative market for data 
analytics, applications and developers will still seek ways to acquire that information. 
                                                 
12 Rory Cellan-Jones, “Fitness App Strava Lights up Staff at Military Bases,” BBC, January 29, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42853072. 
13 Schneier, Data and Goliath, 91–107. 
14 Billy Perrigo, “Whistle-Blower Christopher Wylie on Life after Taking down Cambridge 
Analytica,” Time 192, no. 13 (October 1, 2018): 12–13. 
15 Perrigo, 12–13. 
16 Perrigo, 12–13. 
6 
Interested researchers can still access that data while respecting data privacy. For 
example, prior to beginning their research on local park hotspots, Korpilo, Jalkanen, and 
Lehvävirta contacted the National Advisory Board on Research Ethics in Finland. They 
were able to utilize smartphone GPS data in their study by complying with the principles 
of informed consent.17 The researchers clearly laid out the terms and conditions for data 
collection and use in a letter of consent, which was signed by willing participants. In their 
study, information was anonymized and aggregated before analysis, and the GPS tracking 
data was limited to the areas under study, and specifically excluded any information that 
could be traced to a user’s home or workplace. 
Other researchers and developers concerned with privacy issues have found 
different solutions to addressing the privacy issue. In 2009, Katie Shilton suggests in her 
article that application developers should take responsibility for creating data protection 
standards that ensure systems allow users to decide their privacy settings.18 This idea 
focuses on three main areas: participant primacy (users proactively decide whether third-
party applications have access to data), data legibility (providing a clearer way for users 
to know how their data are being collected and shared), and longitudinal engagement 
(acknowledging that time is a factor that may impact privacy).19  
In their 2017 study, Dai et al. echo Shilton’s recommendations that developers 
take more responsibility in developing solutions to the data-collection privacy issues on 
smartphones. They suggest offering more detailed permission authorizations, which 
would force applications specifically to define what data they will be accessing to allow 
users to have a clearer idea of the data they are releasing.20 In addition, they propose that 
mobile data be moved to cloud computing, which would allow for a more centralized 
                                                 
17 Silviya Korpilo et al., “Where Are the Hotspots and Coldspots of Landscape Values, Visitor Use and 
Biodiversity in an Urban Forest?,” PLoS ONE 13, no. 9 (September 26, 2018): e0203611, https://doi.org/ 
10.1371/journal.pone.0203611. 
18 Katie Shilton, “Four Billion Little Brothers?: Privacy, Mobile Phones, and Ubiquitous Data 
Collection,” Communications of the ACM 52, no. 11 (November 2009): 48–53, https://doi.org/10.1145/159 
2761.1592778. 
19 Shilton, 48–53. 
20 Dai et al., “Who Moved My Data?,” 20–25. 
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storage of smartphone sensor data. Cloud storage provides a more consistent way of 
sharing data and limits applications’ ability to access data without specific permission.21  
Another avenue for potential solutions lies in regulation and policy. In his recent 
article, Aysem Vanberg breaks down the 2018 European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation, and specifically focuses on how it relates to data portability and 
existing U.S. policies.22 Vanberg highlights how the United States does not have a single 
regulatory body to oversee data privacy, which results in many guidelines that are “best 
practices, which are not legally binding.”23 This lack of a single regulatory body has led 
to inconsistent application and enforcement of data privacy guidelines. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis analyzes what type of sensors are embedded in smartphones and 
determines what kind of information is collected and how it is shared to determine 
potential homeland security issues.  
1. Criteria 
Smartphones contain over a dozen different standard sensors. Many of the sensors 
work together to gather and analyze data that can be used to create highly individualized 
profiles. In this study, they are grouped into four main categories: audio and video, 
environmental, location, and biometric. These categories highlight the primary possible 
threat vectors that can have homeland security implications.  
2. Study Limitations and Scope 
The focus of this thesis is limited to sensor data automatically collected by 
smartphones and potentially accessed by applications without express permission. This 
thesis does not include sensor data knowingly provided by the user to applications via 
                                                 
21 Dai et al., 23–25. 
22 Aysem Vanberg, “The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: What Lessons Can Be Learned from 
the EU Experience?,” Journal of Internet Law 21, no. 7 (January 2018): 1–19. 
23 Vanberg, 16. 
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explicit user agreements. This thesis also does not cover individual application security 
protocols but explores operating system (OS) security in reference to sensor data.  
3. Instrumentation 
Data regarding smartphone sensors and their primary intended functions is based 
on publicly available technical specification documents. Information on possible privacy 
and security issues is based on open-source, published documents from previous research 
studies.  
4. Expected Output 
This thesis provides a detailed overview of the type of sensor data collected by 
smartphones and an analysis of the type of threat they present, both currently and in the 
near future. This overview provides a more detailed understanding of what threat vectors 
exist and allows users and organizations to understand the capabilities of their devices 
better. In addition, users and organizations can determine whether their current security 
measures are appropriate for the level of security they require. Based on the data, this 
thesis also provides possible policy recommendations for addressing any potential 
homeland security threats. 
This thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter II focuses on 
identifying the different sensors found in the average smartphone and discusses their 
functions and capabilities. Chapter III discusses the potential privacy and security issues 
by identifying the different entities that have access to sensor data and reviewing the 
possible ways sensor data can be accessed and collected. Chapter IV provides a 
framework for analyzing the type and level of risk associated with smartphone sensor 
loss and reviews what types of scenarios may rise to the level of a homeland security risk. 
Finally, Chapter V summarizes how smartphone sensor data can pose a homeland 
security risk and provides recommendations for moving forward.  
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II. INTRODUCTION TO THE SENSORS 
It has been a typical day at the office, and as Dave packs up his belongings and 
heads home, he takes the stairs instead of the elevator and receives a smartphone alert 
that he has met his workout goals for the day. He is walking across the parking lot when 
his smartphone lets him know that traffic is backed up on his usual route and suggests a 
more efficient route home. It automatically connects to his car via Bluetooth when he 
gets in and resumes playing the last song to which he was listening. Once he gets within a 
few miles of home, his smartphone automatically updates the air conditioning system 
with his preferred at home settings and disables his security system. As he walks into the 
house, it connects to the Wi-Fi and begins backing up data to the cloud. 
Every day, variations of this scenario play out in households across the United 
States. While most users carry their smartphones with them wherever they go and rely on 
them in their daily routines, many are unfamiliar with how much data their smartphones 
are collecting on a continuous basis. Most users are familiar with the camera and 
microphone sensors on their smartphone; they also know that the global positioning 
system (GPS) on their smartphone can track their location. However, most are unaware 
of what sensors are actually on their smartphone, what they are used for, and what data 
they are capable of collecting. In their study, Mehrnezhad et al. conducted a survey of 60 
users, ranging from 18 to 67 years old, who had experience using a smartphone for over 
five years.24 The survey found that while most users were familiar with the camera, 
microphone, and touch screen sensors, few were familiar with the lower level sensors, 
such as the gyroscope, barometer, and accelerometer. In addition, while some may have 
recognized the names of the sensors, or even identified that they were familiar with them, 
they were not necessarily able to explain their functionality.25 Figure 1 provides a visual 
representation of the survey’s results. 
                                                 
24 Mehrnezhad et al., “Stealing PINs via Mobile Sensors,” 300. 
25 Mehrnezhad et al., 300–301. 
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Figure 1. User Familiarity with Smartphone Sensors.26 
Rising levels of privacy and security awareness has led to speculation about how 
much smartphones are able to spy on their owners.27 To address those concerns and 
                                                 
26 Source: Mehrnezhad et al., 301. 
27 Daniel Howley, “Why People Think Their Phones Are Listening to Them,” Yahoo! Finance, March 
11, 2019, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/facebook-amazon-google-smartphone-spying-170721118.html. 
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identify potential privacy or security risks, it is important to identify what those sensors 
actually are, what they do, and what data they collect.  
While numerous sensors are being used, with more being designed to meet 
different requirements, existing sensors generally fall into four main categories: audio 
and visual, environmental, location, and biometric. Different smartphone brands and 
models may vary on how many and which sensors they include; in general, a standard set 
of sensors are included in every smartphone based on system requirements and 
user expectations, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Standard Smartphone Sensors.28 
This chapter identifies the main sensors belonging to each group and provides a 
description of what they do, the type of data they collect, and how that data is shared.  
A. AUDIO AND VISUAL SENSORS 
Out of all the sensors, users are most familiar with the camera and audio 
recording sensors of their smartphone. The camera is used to capture images, including 
both stills and movies. With their smaller sensors, smartphone cameras are not as 
powerful as traditional, professional cameras, but they are comparable to regular compact 
28 Source: Sumit Majumder and M. Jamal Deen, “Smartphone Sensors for Health Monitoring and 
Diagnosis,” Sensors 19, no. 9 (January 2019): 5, https://doi.org/10.3390/s19092164. 
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cameras and small enough to be embedded into the phone to allow users to take 
photographs on the go.29 With the popularity of the selfie, an additional camera was 
added to the smartphone, for a total of at least two onboard cameras; one in the front and 
one on the back.30 In addition to taking photos, the camera can be used by different 
applications to perform a variety of tasks, including scanning barcodes and quick 
response code (QR codes), sending video feeds, and magnifying images. It can also 
translate foreign text via optical character recognition (OCR), add augmented reality, 
scan documents, and identify stellar constellations.  
Camera sensor technology has improved to the point that several studies have 
been conducted to determine their usability in health monitoring apps. In one 2018 study, 
Aydemir et al. found that the infrared and red, green, blue (RGB) sensors in newer 
smartphones are accurate enough to serve as a type of photo plethysmography to identify 
heart rates.31 In their study, they measured test subjects’ skin blood content by calculating 
changes in skin color using videos taken by smartphones and data taken by 
photoplethysmography (PPG) sensors. After comparing the data sets, their findings 
indicated that with the green light sensor, the smartphone cameras were able to record 
heart rate changes accurately, stating “it displayed nearly perfect correlation with the 
contact infrared PPG.”32 A similar study conducted by Wang et al. found that the RGB 
camera and white light-emitting diode (LED) in smartphones could measure hemoglobin 
levels by having the users place their fingers over the camera and LED; light wavelengths 
are measured from the video to analyze hemoglobin levels.33 According to the study, 
                                                 
29 James Abbott, “Smartphones vs Cameras: Do You Still Need a DSLR?,” TechRadar, March 9, 2018, 
https://www.techradar.com/news/smartphones-vs-cameras-do-you-still-need-a-dslr. 
30 “Sensors—Definition,” GSMArena, accessed October 23, 2018, https://www.gsmarena.com/gloss 
ary.php3?term=sensors. 
31 Berkant Aydemir et al., “Remote Assessment of Heart Rate and Its Fluctuations by Smartphone 
Camera” (2018 Electric Electronics, Computer Science, Biomedical Engineerings’ Meeting (EBBT), 
Istanbul, Turkey: IEEE, 2018), 1–4, https://doi.org/10.1109/EBBT.2018.8391434. 
32 Aydemir et al., 2. 
33 Edward J. Wang et al., “Noninvasive Hemoglobin Measurement Using Unmodified Smartphone 
Camera and White Flash,” in 2017 39th Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in 
Medicine and Biology Society (EMBC) (Seogwipo, South Korea: IEEE, 2017), 2333–36, https://doi.org/10. 
1109/EMBC.2017.8037323.  
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these measurements can possibly lead to apps that can flag potential anemia or nutritional 
deficiency issues without additional sensor devices.34 
Smartphones also house a microphone. One of the most basic sensors on the 
smartphone, the microphone detects, measures, and records sound. It is necessary for the 
user to be able to participate in phone calls. Users are most familiar with using this sensor 
to record audio (as sound recordings or as part of videos), engage with voice activated 
assistants (e.g., Siri, Cortana, or Google Assistant), and to dictate to apps that turn speech 
into text.35  
Like the camera, the microphone has also been the subject of studies for potential 
medical use. In a 2017 study, Zubaydi et al. demonstrated that an app could be designed 
to use onboard smartphone microphones, and other sensors, to identify and monitor 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), a chronic lung disease.36 Normally, 
patients are diagnosed with COPD by getting a spirometry test. Once diagnosed, it is 
important to get regular spirometry checks to monitor the stage of the disease 
adequately.37 In their study, Zubaydi et al. developed a model to compute the two 
primary parameters associated with COPD by analyzing the exhalations recorded by the 
microphone and creating a link between the frequency response of the exhalation and the 
flow rate. Next, they designed an app that would analyze the data to diagnose a patient 
and identify the stage of the disease. According to their study, the percentage of error 
between the smartphone microphone and the clinical spirometer data ranged from 3.1 
percent to 4.6 percent, with all 25 patients correctly diagnosed.38 
                                                 
34 “IOS Device Compatibility Reference,” Developer, iOS Developer Documentation Archive, October 
30, 2017, https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeviceInformation/Reference/iOS 
DeviceCompatibility/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix/DeviceCompatibilityMatrix.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP
40013599-CH17-SW1. 
35 Manisha Priyadarshini, “Which Sensors Do I Have in My Smartphone? How Do They Work?,” 
Fossbytes (blog), September 25, 2018, https://fossbytes.com/which-smartphone-sensors-how-work/. 
36 Fatama Zubaydi et al., “MobSpiro: Mobile Based Spirometry for Detecting COPD,” in 2017 IEEE 
7th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC) (Las Vegas, NV: IEEE, 
2017), 1–4, https://doi.org/10.1109/CCWC.2017.7868345. 
37 Zubaydi et al., 1. 
38 Zubaydi et al., 4. 
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B. ENVIRONMENTAL SENSORS 
Environmental sensors focus on gathering data to determine the environment the 
smartphone is in and how the smartphone is positioned. This information can trigger the 
smartphone to respond automatically with different settings in specific scenarios. 
Light sensors measure the light levels near the smartphone to adjust the screen’s 
display brightness as needed based on the user’s selected settings.39 The camera also 
utilizes it in certain modes to determine the need to use flash. In addition to the light 
sensor, some smartphones have an RGB light sensor, which measures the red, green, and 
blue wavelengths of light. The results are used to help the smartphone automatically 
correct the white balance on the screen. 
The barometer measures the air pressure around the smartphone, which can be 
used to identify weather changes and determine the altitude where it is located. 
Information from this sensor allows apps to determine if a user has climbed a flight of 
stairs or identify what floor they are on in a building.40  
Touchscreen sensors provide data that allows the smartphone to know what 
portions of the screen a user is pointing to, which is a critical component for all 
smartphone functionality. Touchscreens track a user’s movements across the screen to 
determine what actions or functions are needed. Touchscreens are also capable of 
differentiating how much pressure is being utilized, which can trigger different 
responses.41 
Proximity sensors determine how close the smartphone is to another object by 
utilizing an infrared (IR) LED and IR light detector.42 One of the basic functions that uses 
this data is the smartphone’s ability to disable the touchscreen display when the 
                                                 
39 David Nield, “All the Sensors in Your Smartphone, and How They Work,” Gizmodo, July 23, 2017, 
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smartphone is brought up the user’s face.43 This ability ensures that incoming calls are 
not interrupted and the screen is automatically reactivated once the smartphone senses 
that it has been moved away by a specific distance. 
While not commonly found in most phones, some smartphones have additional 
specialized environmental sensors, such as an air humidity sensor and a Geiger counter, 
which can detect radiation levels.44 
C. LOCATION SENSORS 
Maps and navigation are some of the most often used applications on 
smartphones. To gather the information needed to determine where a smartphone is at 
any given moment accurately, a variety of sensors is involved. 
More commonly known as the compass, the magnetometer detects magnetic 
fields, which allows the smartphone to determine its position in relation to north.45 The 
smartphone is then able to determine how map applications should be oriented.46 In 
addition, while not a standard application on smartphones, it can also be used in metal 
detector apps. 
Accelerometer data is used to measure how fast a smartphone is moving, how it is 
tilted, and the level of vibration.47 This information is used for a variety of automated 
functions that users take for granted, such as updating expected arrival times in 
navigating, determining activity type for health trackers, detecting whether the phone is 
facing up or down (which may determine sleep mode), and whether the phone is in 
landscape or portrait mode (allowing the screen to adjust accordingly).48 
The gyroscope also provides data on the smartphone’s direction and orientation 
(e.g., whether it is facing up or down and whether it is pointed towards left or right). It 
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assists the accelerometer by adding information on the smartphone’s rotation and the 
direction it is moved.49 Many augmented reality or navigation applications use this data 
to determine where the smartphone is pointed to identify a starting point.50 Gyroscopes 
also provide more detailed, accurate information for mobile gaming than the 
accelerometer. 
Smartphone GPS utilize satellite information to identify the smartphone’s location 
anywhere in the world. As shown in Figure 3, using signals from multiple satellites, the 
GPS receiver triangulates its position and returns coordinates in the form of longitude and 
latitude, which software apps then use to provide navigation information; GPS was 
accurate within about 20 feet in the early 2000s, but new GPS receivers and additional 
satellite deployments can now identify a user’s location within 12 inches.51  
 
Figure 3. Smartphone-Assisted GPS.52 
Navigation and location dependent applications rely on GPS data to function. Since GPS 
receivers only passively receive satellite signals, they do not use up phone data or require 
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an internet connection; however, without access to the internet, navigational apps will not 
be able to render the maps themselves.53 
Together, the location sensors provide enough data points on users’ location and 
movement that apps can generate surprisingly accurate and detailed results. Other than 
navigational apps, many other apps find this information to be useful, such as health 
trackers, fitness apps, locator apps, and retailers. For example, Cosmose is a startup 
company marketing its services to retailers. The company claims it can accurately track a 
user by location data to within six feet inside a store.54 According to Miron Mironiuk, 
CEO and founder of Cosmose, “We can tell that someone was trying the makeup, 
someone was trying fragrance.”55 By tracking over one billion smartphones over 100,000 
retailers, Cosmose claims it is able to use a combination of location data and artificial 
intelligence (AI) data analysis to assist stores in boosting sales.56  
D. BIOMETRIC SENSORS 
Biometric sensors include sensors that capture specific identification data from 
the user. This type of data can include fingerprints, facial scans, movement patterns, and 
any other measurements that relate to human characteristics.57 The information is used by 
various applications that utilize biometric authentication, such as unlocking smartphones, 
authorizing payment, or serving as an alternative to a password in other apps.58  
Pedometers in smartphones keep track of movements like running or walking, 
with many fitness-tracking applications using the information to count an individual’s 
steps and types of movement.59 The inclusion of the pedometer in smartphones means 
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that users do not necessarily have to purchase a separate fitness tracker unless they prefer 
having a wearable device.  
Fingerprint sensors are scanners that digitally record fingerprints by measuring 
the patterns and distances of each print.60 Since fingerprints serve as an authentication 
option, many hackers have attempted to find ways to spoof this biometric. In 2014, Jan 
Krissler was able to reverse engineer and duplicate the fingerprints of Ursula von der 
Leyen, Germany’s defense minister, with a combination of publicly available high-
resolution photos and commercially available software.61 Researchers have been 
examining ways to address this issue by coming up with ways to recognize “liveness 
detection.”62 According to Matthew Valenti, site director at West Virginia University, 
“There are subtle features that are only present in a living person. Your fingers, for 
example, have tiny pores in them, and the signal processing algorithms used to scan your 
fingerprint can look for the presence of sweat in your pores. A spoof wouldn't have 
that.”63 This idea was tested in a study done by Bozhao Tan and Stephanie Schuckers, 
who compared live fingerprints with models, including silicon, clay, gelatin, and 
cadavers.64 The study showed that sensors were able to identify differences between live 
fingerprints and the models by the patterns of perspiration; perspiration in live fingers 
either showed the pore as a dot when dry, or completely covered the pore when wet.65 By 
utilizing this information, Tan and Schuckers were able to develop algorithms to classify 
fingerprints with an 84 to 100 percent rate.66  
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Facial recognition sensors include infrared and face mapping.67 Some 
smartphones also include iris sensors, which focus on identifying unique patterns in the 
eye. Like the fingerprint sensors, they are used for biometric authentication; some 
applications use these sensors to improve their functionality. For example, photography 
applications utilize non-specific facial recognition to detect faces in a photo to determine 
focus points automatically. Other applications use facial recognition data points to 
identify specific individuals and group their images, such as in photo albums. 
As more smartphone functions and apps rely on biometric data for convenient 
user authentication, developers continue to look for ways to increase security and 
reliability. As stated by Professor Alan Woodward from Surrey University, “People are 
starting to look for things where the biometric is alive—vein recognition in fingers, gait 
analysis—they are also biometrics but they are chosen because the person has to be in 
possession of them and exhibiting them in real life.”68 
E. WHAT CAN ALL THIS DATA DO? 
Each sensor plays a vital role in basic smartphone functionality; however, sensors 
generate enough data as a collective group for application developers to design apps that 
can enhance day-to-day tasks. From the medical field to retail, research, and more, the 
subject areas that sensor data can be put to use is unlimited. 
For example, in the burgeoning field of health monitoring, developers and health 
organizations are seeing the benefits of utilizing the data gathered by smartphone sensors 
to create a comprehensive health picture of not only individuals, but also groups. In a 
study by Sumit Majumder and J. Jamal Deen, they discuss the merits of utilizing existing 
smartphone sensors to track the health and well-being of older patients to increase the 
prevention or early detection of diseases.69 Specifically, they posited that existing sensors 
on the smartphone could track the health of the eyes, skin, ears, and lungs, as well as 
cardiovascular activity, daily activities and falls, sleep patterns, and cognitive functions 
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and mental health.70 As seen in Table 1, in comparison to costly, specialized medical 
devices, the study indicates that the smartphone’s prevalence and ease of use lends itself 
to be an economical and practical alternative.71 




In another study, Ming Liu discusses how evaluating data from the accelerometer, 
gyroscope, magnetometer, GPS, and video allowed researchers to identify differences in 
driving styles to determine “nonaggressive and aggressive driving.”73 Researchers used 
the identification of hard turns, swerves, acceleration patterns, and braking behavior to 
categorize aggressive driving; studies also utilized accelerometer data to identify 
potential drunk driving behaviors.74 
With the number of sensors embedded in smartphones and the quantity and type 
of data they collect, the end result is that smartphones house an enormous amount of 
personal data about their users that can be used to make determinations about individuals 
and groups. As individual data points, the information could already be considered 
sensitive by most users; in the aggregate, the data could reveal more detailed information 
about users than they would like to think. Perhaps Henry Wolfe, University of Otago, 
summarizes the capabilities of the mole in your pocket best, “Mobile phones remain the 
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most efficient surveillance mechanism, allowing a variety of tracking and monitoring 
techniques to be concentrated in a single always-on device.”75 The next chapter takes a 
closer look at the ways smartphone sensor data can be misused and the potential privacy 
and security concerns. 
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III. THE PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONCERNS 
In June 2009, Air France Flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris crashed into the 
Atlantic Ocean; all 216 passengers and 12 crew members were killed.76 Investigators 
initially suspected an issue with erroneous indicated airspeed, but were later able to 
confirm the detailed events that eventually led to the crash once the plane’s black boxes 
were recovered.77 According to the final investigation report, a review of the data 
recorded by the black boxes revealed a mixture of technical issues and a “picture of 
profound confusion and poor task sharing between the two copilots.”78 The results of the 
investigation led to recommendations for changes to maintenance procedures, 
modification of the reference systems, and modified flight crew training to avoid future 
incidents.79  
Hailed as one of the most important inventions in aviation safety, black boxes 
have been installed in airplanes for over half a century.80 Built to survive crash scenarios, 
they are capable of recording “256 distinct streams of digital data, or parameters, per 
second, and store them all for 25 hours before writing over them.”81 The data recorded 
includes audio, acceleration, altitude, temperature, cabin pressure, airspeed, and engine 
status, among other things; together, these data points allow investigators to identify what 
went wrong and initiate recommendations to improve aviation safety.82 
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Based on the capabilities of the sensors previously discussed, today’s 
smartphones have the same, if not superior, ability to record multiple streams of data 
about a user. Some sensor data is automatically gathered and utilized by core functions of 
the smartphone, but with the increase in data breaches, data privacy discussions, and the 
resulting media attention, more and more users are wondering where their data is going 
and who is looking at it. This chapter reviews and evaluates the current concerns. 
A. PERMISSIONS: WHO CAN ACCESS MY SENSORS AND SEE MY 
DATA? 
1. Manufacturers 
Manufacturers are responsible for designing, building, and supporting 
smartphones, so they automatically have a level of control over the hardware, which 
includes the sensors, and the OS that includes software controls for the sensors. Since 
users purchase their smartphones from manufacturers and expect a certain level of 
customer service, most users generally do not consider them as active potential threats to 
sensor data privacy or security. However, due to media attention to data breaches, a rising 
concern is that manufacturers are not adequately protecting user data. More users are 
questioning how their data is being stored and used and how much control manufacturers 
actually have.  
Manufacturers walk a fine line between assuring users they can provide support or 
reset stolen smartphones remotely to ensure their data privacy and reminding them that 
they can essentially take control of certain portions of their smartphones at any time. This 
knowledge tends to resurface and cause concerns on a recurring basis. In late 2018, 
Google caught the attention of Android users when they noticed that their smartphones’ 
battery saving feature had been activated without their knowledge.83 Google later claimed 
responsibility by indicating they were running “an internal experiment to test battery 
saving features that were mistakenly rolled out to more users than intended.”84 It should 
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be pointed out that this particular setting was changed not just on smartphones 
manufactured by Google, but other smartphones running the Android OS (i.e., the Nokia 
7 Plus).85 This incident reminded users how manufacturers have the ability to update user 
settings without their knowledge. Often the subject of much debate, kill switches are 
software or hardware security features that allow users and manufacturers to disable and 
control a smartphone’s data remotely (either by deleting data completely or locking it 
down).86 This feature was put in place to deter theft of both the smartphone and user data, 
but still occasionally generates a level of concern from users on the potential for 
manufacturers to control their devices. 
In the course of manufacturing smartphones, components may come from 
different parts of the world and be assembled somewhere else; software can be installed 
at any point. In other words, the manufacturer is not the only one with initial access and 
control of the smartphone. In one incident, it was found that a U.S. phone manufacturer 
received 120,000 smartphones with preinstalled firmware that contained code that 
automatically sent the user’s text messages to Shanghai, China every three days; the 
software also monitored whom users were talking to and where they were going.87 This 
incident highlights how malicious code can be installed at any point in the manufacturing 
process. 
2. Telecommunication Carriers 
Telecommunication carriers provide the voice and data connections smartphones 
need to interact online. Therefore, they have a significant amount of access to smartphone 
data, including call logs, text messages, internet traffic, subscriber identification module 
(SIM) card data, usage history, and sensor data.88 Smartphones make frequent 
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connections to active cell towers to provide mandated emergency location data and 
network maintenance activity; as a result, they also have access to enhanced location 
data, including assisted GPS data. 
3. Application and Web Developers and Third Parties 
Sensor data are primarily stored onboard the smartphone, especially when used in 
conjunction with basic functions of the smartphone (e.g., fingerprints or facial scans for 
biometric identification to unlock the smartphone). However, for some sensors, users 
may opt to store sensor data elsewhere. For example, users may opt to store photos and 
videos from the camera directly to the cloud on server space. While users must consent to 
this storage, few read the fine details on how the web services will protect that data or 
who will be allowed to access it; for those who do read it, the terms may still not 
explicitly state everything they need to know.89  
Smartphone sensor data may also be requested and collected by the apps users 
choose to download. Smartphone manufacturers have requirements in place for app 
developers to limit data collection to what is necessary and request user permission to 
access certain sensors.90 In light of the current focus on data privacy, they have also 
publicly indicated that they have taken additional measures to ensure that developers 
make those terms and conditions clearer. However, this requirement does not extend to 
all sensors; for example, while apps are required to gain permission to access GPS, other 
location sensors like the accelerometer and gyroscope do not require explicit user 
permission.91 The accelerometer and gyroscope do not require specific permissions 
because the data are needed for basic app settings, like determining phone orientation to 
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provide a user-friendly experience. With access to these sensors, apps can utilize the data 
in any manner they choose.  
For those sensors for which apps must request permission, the terms and 
conditions still generally fail to articulate clearly the purpose of the data collection and its 
use92 A large number of apps tend to request access to more sensors and sensor data than 
needed for the app’s primary function. In their paper, Tsavli et al. state that app 
developers must limit the timeframe sensor data is retained, ensure the data requested is 
proportionate to the primary function of the app, and prohibit any secondary or unrelated 
use of the data to comply with data protection principles.93 
In addition, the terms and agreements that users are required to accept prior to app 
installation frequently include vague language that indicate the app can send data to third 
parties without specifying who the third parties may be or what specific information can 
be sent. In one study by the Wall Street Journal, 11 out of over 70 apps tested were found 
to be sending some data to Facebook as a third party, likely without the users’ 
knowledge.94 According to the study, most of the apps’ terms and agreements or privacy 
policies did not specifically include language identifying Facebook as a recipient of their 
information; instead, most only addressed data sharing policies in a general manner and 
did not indicate that private information would be shared. Some of the data sent to 
Facebook included blood pressure, heart rate, weight, alcohol consumption, menstrual 
cycles, and in some cases, sexual activity.95 While this thesis does not address the privacy 
or security issues of data knowingly and willingly shared with apps, this study is of 
interest in that it highlights how apps may forward user data to third parties without a 
user’s explicit or known consent. This sharing also impacts sensor data; if an app is 
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forwarding data that it has gathered with express permission, it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that other sensor data collected could be passed along as well. 
Mobile web browsers are also able to access smartphone sensor data; in contrast 
to apps, mobile browsers do not need to have apps installed and instead use scripts to run 
code. While websites need to request access to GPS data, they do not need to request user 
permission to access other sensors or sensor data, such as orientation and motion.96 Users 
generally do not notice this data collection, as no notice is required, and depending on the 
code utilized, data collection may happen even when the browser is minimized or when 
the smartphone has been locked.97 
B. CONCERNS: WHAT IS MY PHONE DOING? 
Over the last several years, users have expressed increasing privacy and security 
concerns that primarily center around the possibility of smartphones recording them, 
tracking them, or stealing their personal data. This concern has led to a large amount of 
reports and media coverage, which has garnered the attention of regulatory bodies across 
the globe.  
1. Is My Phone Recording Me? 
One of the most prevalent concerns from users currently dominating the media is 
the suspicion that smartphones are secretly recording them; a concern has been raised that 
unknown entities have the ability to take over and remotely control the camera or 
microphone at will, which turns them on and records images and sound without the user’s 
knowledge or consent. This concern has been particularly aggravated by the accuracy of 
targeted online marketing, which increases the belief that smartphones are listening in to 
conversations to deliver the highly specific ads. Multiple media sources question whether 
the microphone is always on and sends information on key words in conversations to 
large companies or social media apps, which results in a more specific, targeted ad 
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experience online.98 Many users seem to believe that the accuracy of marketing is based 
on this data collection tactic. Due to its massive membership and recent publicity 
regarding privacy violations, Facebook has been at the forefront of this issue and has 
denied on multiple occasions that they are listening to and analyzing the conversations of 
its members via their smartphones; instead, they claim that their success in providing user 
specific ads are based on user actions and habits online.99  
A recent 2018 study by Pan et al. reviewed over 17,260 apps from four different 
app stores (Google Play, AppChina, Mi.com, and Anzhi) to analyze their terms and 
conditions and their behavior to determine whether media data were being leaked.100 In 
the course of their research, Pan et al. found that few of the apps analyzed included code 
to access the microphone. While Facebook was one of them, contrary to public opinion, 
the study did not indicate that Facebook was sending information outside what would be 
expected. However, the study did identify several concerning possible privacy violations, 
potentially due to misleading privacy notifications or the lack of explicit language to 
explain how the camera, microphone, or data can be used. 
In one case study, Pan et al. identified a video leak from an app that automatically 
recorded video of what was happening on the screen and sent the videos to a third party 
that served as an analytics provider.101 The app was marketed as a delivery service for 
users and did not flag that videos would be taken or sent to a third party. The study 
revealed that as soon as the user opened the app, it started recording what was happening 
on the screen and uploaded the video to an analytics website. According to the study, the 
analytics provider stated that they offered the ability to “[w]atch every user action and 
understand exactly how they use your app… See the app through your users’ eyes to 
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pinpoint usability, UX and performance issues.”102 Pan et al. go on to state that this 
particular analytics provider is used in other apps and has the potential to record whatever 
sensitive user data is on the screen.103 For example, users logging onto a site with a 
visible password and user ID may have their information exposed if the screen is 
recorded and uploaded to a third party site. 
In another scenario in the same study, Pan et al. found that another app was taking 
screenshots of the app while users were interacting with it and uploading the images to a 
website.104 While this particular code can normally be found during beta testing to 
identify issues, the study indicates that this particular app was not labeled as a beta 
version in the app store; in addition, the app did not ask the user for permission to be 
recorded or notify them that screenshots would be uploaded to a website.  
In each case, users agreed to the terms and conditions, which identified that the 
camera and microphone could be used; however, the terms failed to indicate how and 
when they would be utilized and did not specifically identify the third parties or how the 
data would be shared. In addition, the camera and microphone were not used in ways that 
would be readily apparent to the user or relate to the primary expected function of the 
app. It is critical to note that the study found that third-party code included in the app 
requires no additional or specific permission to record the screen and does not need to 
notify the user.105 
In another type of data leak, Apple was recently highlighted in an incident with its 
FaceTime feature. Reported as an inadvertent bug, an error in the programming allowed 
individuals to see and hear through the smartphone owner’s camera and microphone even 
though the owner had not answered the FaceTime call.106 This error opened the door for 
potential privacy breaches, as smartphone owners would not have been aware that they 
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could be seen or heard. Apple has since addressed the matter, but it highlighted another 
type of privacy and security issue; instances where apps have appropriately requested, 
and users have legitimately granted, sensor access and the app then inadvertently exposes 
that data. 
2. Is My Phone Tracking Me? 
Though most users find it convenient to be able to immediately locate their lost 
smartphone or check on their friend’s location via tracking apps, it becomes a bit more 
disconcerting when they realize that their smartphone has passively collected enough 
location data to track every location they have visited for as long as they have had the 
smartphone. Calacci et al. point out that numerous smartphone apps that collect location 
data as a primary function (e.g., navigation, weather, and news) also frequently share this 
data with third parties who collect and analyze user data; location data brokers commonly 
pay to have app developers include code that collect location data in the background.107 
The datasets that result from data brokers compiling all the data from different apps have 
significant privacy and security risks. For their study, Calacci et al. purchased a dataset 
from a data broker; the data contained latitude and longitude coordinates with timestamps 
for all the users involved. While the data was supposed to be anonymized, the team was 
able to re-identify distinct users within the dataset; they point to previous research that 
has shown that “only four spatio-temporal points are needed to re-identify 95% of users 
in such a dataset.”108 
In addition to location data from apps, Calacci et al. point out the fact that 
telecommunication companies have long collected and stored call detail records (CDRs), 
which include communication and location data from their customers.109 During calls, 
smartphones communicate with the nearest antenna, which allows telecom companies to 
identify the general location of the user at specific times. In early 2019, Motherboard 
published an investigation where it identified that three large U.S. telecommunications 
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companies had sold customer smartphone real-time location data from approximately 
2012 to 2017, which were later bought by over 250 bounty hunters and other associated 
entities.110 According to the investigation, some of the data included assisted GPS (A-
GPS), which utilizes a combination of a smartphone’s GPS and information from the 
telecom network to more quickly and accurately locate a phone; A-GPS is usually used to 
determine cell phone locations for 911 calls and was developed by public safety and 
telecom carriers.  
Smartphones can not only track users’ locations, but can also use sensor data to 
determine in which type of activities users are engaging. Kwapisz, Weiss, and Moore 
utilized onboard smartphone accelerometers to perform activity recognition, which 
consists of identifying in what physical activity a user is engaged.111 In comparison to 
other previous activity recognition studies, which required the use of multiple sensors 
attached to subjects on various parts of their body, Kwapisz, Weiss, and Moore utilized 
the onboard accelerometers on a smartphone and capitalized on the fact that users were 
already used to carrying them around everywhere. They collected data from 29 subjects 
as they performed a variety of activities, including standing, walking, jogging, sitting, 
and going up and down stairs.112 This data allowed them to build a predictive model for 
activity recognition utilizing three algorithms. By analyzing data readings from the 
accelerometer, the algorithms were able to identify most activities accurately over 90 
percent of the time.113 Of note, they were able to generate these results from only 10 
seconds worth of accelerometer data gathered while the smartphones were carried in the 
subjects’ pockets.114 
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3. Is My Phone Stealing My Personal Data? 
In addition to concerns that smartphones are secretly recording audio and video 
files and tracking their locations, users are also concerned about the other potentially 
sensitive data smartphone sensors may be able to collect about them. Users have 
speculated on whether smartphones are able to identify passwords or pin numbers simply 
by using touchscreen data or audio from the microphone.115  
In their 2017 study, Mehrnezhad et al. examined the feasibility of using 
smartphone sensors to capture personal identification numbers (PINs).116 By using the 
motion and orientation sensors via a mobile web browser, which do not require explicit 
permission from the user to access, the team found that a JavaScript code could analyze 
the data to infer the user’s PIN by utilizing an artificial neural network. According to 
their results, the code was able to identify PINs correctly within the first try 74 percent of 
the time, based on a set of 50 PINs composed of four digits; the algorithm was able to 
guess correctly 86 percent of the time on the second try and 94 percent of the time on the 
third try.117 
Researchers at Cambridge University and Linkoping University conducted 
another similar study. Shumailov et al. found that they could successfully identify 
passwords by detecting and analyzing the soundwaves made by tapping out passwords on 
smartphone touch screens.118 By using the microphone, they were able to capture the 
soundwaves and utilize an algorithm that recognized keystrokes by their specific 
vibrations; their study assumed that malware had been preinstalled on the smartphone or 
downloaded by the user. Using a test group of 45 subjects, Shumailov et al. were able to 
identify 146 out of 200 PINs correctly on smartphones within 10 tries.119 
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In short, smartphone sensors have the capacity and capability to record, track, and 
collect users’ personal data. The sensors and sensor data can also be manipulated 
remotely. However, that capability does not come from some unknown, remote entity at 
will; permission must come from somewhere, whether that be from accepting 
manufacturers’ controls, agreeing to terms and conditions, or loading malware. 
Dave Morgan, Simulmedia Founder and Chief Executive, stated, “We have to be 
really careful as we have more devices capturing more information in living rooms and 
bedrooms and on the street and in other people’s homes that the public is not blindsided 
and surprised by things. It’s not what’s legal. It is what’s not creepy.”120 
C. DATA AGGREGATION: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER 
As previously discussed, each dataset from the different sensors can be considered 
highly personal and sensitive, even if anonymized. Combining the datasets of all the 
sensors in the smartphone ultimately creates a highly personalized black box that can 
essentially retrace a user’s actions in great detail for an indefinite amount of time and 
potentially project future actions. As stated by Calacci et al.: 
In this data we can observe where a person [sic] been, how long they 
stayed there, and the route they took to get there… The velocity of an 
individual at any point in a trip can also be… used to classify which mode 
of transport they were likely taking… We were able to infer home 
locations for approximately 80% of users in our dataset by observing 
where they regularly stayed between the hours of 8pm and 4am, as well as 
map out where they most likely worked during the day, and where else 
they went.121 
In 2018, the New York Times released a study that brought to light just how 
effective and accurate data aggregation and predictive analytics could be. Utilizing a 
database with sample location information from 2017, which contained over 235 million 
locations from over 1.2 million smartphones over three days, the New York Times was 
able to identify specific individuals from the anonymized data by tracking and analyzing 
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the location data.122 The New York Times was able to identify one user by studying her 
travel patterns by noting that over the timeframe involved, only one user followed the 
same route, travel from a residential address (her home) to a school (her place of 
employment); she was logged over 800 times at the school, in most instances, specifically 
in her classroom. Receiving permission to examine her data further, the New York Times 
was able to track her movements as she went about her day and noted that she “went to a 
Weight Watchers meeting and to her dermatologist’s office for a minor procedure. It 
followed her hiking with her dog and staying at her ex-boyfriend’s home.”123 Since the 
location data in the study was recorded frequently, the New York Times was able to 
identify how long she was in each location and logged her most often visited sites. The 
New York Times was able to acquire this dataset from a location data company, one of 
many that sells its datasets and analysis to a variety of different companies looking for 
data and insight into their clients, rivals, or potential customers. GroundTruth executive 
Elina Greenstein stated, “We look to understand who a person is, based on where they’ve 
been and where they’re going, in order to influence what they’re going to do next.”124 
Based on the current and anticipated capabilities of sensors and the apps that can 
analyze and project what that data means, smartphones can provide insight into users’ 
movements, relationships, health, fitness, employment, personal data, and more. As part 
of a larger group of users, datasets can also identify patterns of behavior and movement. 
In addition, while the exposure of a single PIN number, password, or location might have 
relatively minimal impact, compromising an entire group may have larger implications. 
As these larger, potential ramifications are considered, it must be determined whether 
smartphone sensor data remains an individual or organizational privacy and security issue 
or whether it also rises to the level of consideration for potential homeland security risks. 
The next chapter discusses a possible framework with which to determine the level and 
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type of risk associated with smartphone sensor data and potential threat vectors 
specifically impacting homeland security. 
37 
IV. ANALYSIS
In January 2018, as shown in Figure 4, a tweet from Nathan Ruser, an Australian 
university student, started a firestorm of media attention when he brought to light the 
potential security risks of Strava’s published global heatmap. Strava, a fitness social 
media platform, provides an app that utilizes a smartphone’s GPS and data collected from 
wearable devices (e.g., Fitbit and Jawbone) to track exercise activity and allows over 27 
million users worldwide to monitor their fitness against other users.125 In his message, 
Ruser tweeted “Strava released their global heatmap. 13 trillion GPS points from their 
users (turning off data sharing is an option) … It looks very pretty, but not amazing for 
Op-Sec. US Bases are clearly identifiable and mappable.”126  
Figure 4. Nathan Ruser’s Strava Tweet.127 
        As demonstrated in Figure 5, the New York Times released a video with detailed 
satellite images with Strava’s heatmaps that showed how the data exposed U.S. 
military bases in 
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military bases in Afghanistan, Niger, and Djibouti, along with a French military base 
and other sites of interest.128 
Figure 5. Strava Heat Map: Military Base Exposed.129 
Although Strava was operating within the bounds of its terms and agreements to 
collect and share the data used to generate the heatmap, it is a prime example of how data 
aggregation can, inadvertently or not, expose sensitive information and raise privacy and 
security risks. Studying the larger issues surrounding the impact of the Strava exposure, 
McKenna, Gaudion, and Evans identified the need to take a closer look at how data can 
be aggregated between multiple data sources, including smartphone sensors, social 
media, satellite data, and software to identify and address potential privacy and security 
risks.130 In their analysis, they identified this “across-device, across-platform, and multi-
sourced data aggregation” as “the satellite-smart device information nexus,” which they 
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state, “poses a threat to individual privacy, civil liberties, and national security.”131 They 
addressed the fact that while private industry does not collect and aggregate this data with 
malicious intent, they nonetheless open the door for potential risk. Their analysis 
specifically focuses on the complex regulations and relationships that allow satellite 
information to be shared and aggregated with other sensor data through multiple vectors; 
however, this information can be extrapolated to the larger issue of how smartphone 
sensor data can be collected, shared, and aggregated in such a way as to generate privacy 
and security risks. This chapter provides a framework to identify the type and level of 
risk involved to determine when smartphone sensor data loss or exposure may have 
individual, organizational, or homeland security risks. 
A. DEFINING A RISK FRAMEWORK 
The amount and type of sensitive information smartphone sensors collect means 
that the loss or exposure of that data inherently comes with privacy and security risks. To 
analyze the type and level of risk involved appropriately, it is helpful to review existing 
security taxonomies to determine if a defined framework already exists. Taxonomies are 
orderly classification schemes that help provide consistency in identifying nodes of a 
system. Nodes are defined as a grouping methodology for related system elements within 
a complex system.  
In their work, Canbek, Sagiroglu, and Baykal reviewed 28 existing security 
taxonomies to determine if mobile security could be effectively reviewed and 
evaluated.132 As the studies were conducted over the last 25 years, Canbek, Sagiroglu, 
and Baykal found that the taxonomies were dated and failed to distinctly define the 
different threat and vulnerability elements of current mobile security needs. Compared to 
the previous taxonomies they studied, which contained approximately 40 nodes, they 
proposed two new taxonomies and classified 1,322 nodes specifically designed to address 
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mobile security.133 These new taxonomies are expansive and cover a broad spectrum of 
threat and vulnerability issues currently facing mobile security. Of note, they move 
beyond the primary aspects of “confidentiality, integrity, and availability” when 
discussing information security to add “privacy, identification, and anonymity” as new, 
high priority nodes that need to be addressed in mobile security.134 
As this thesis is more narrowly focused on potential smartphone sensor data 
collection and exposure risks, it focuses on identifying the type of risk involved and the 
potential impact. The type of risk is evaluated and categorized based on whether the 
impact most likely affects an individual or organization. Next, the level of risk is 
determined based on a probability and potential impact index (Figure 6). Probability is 
assigned a value between 0 and 4 based on no probability to high probability for an event 
to occur. Impact is rated on a scale of 0 to 4 based on the potential impact if an even 
occurred, which ranged from no impact to very high impact. At the low end of the scale, 
a no probability, no impact event receives a 0 rating. At the high end of the scale, with a 
high probability and very high impact, an event receives a rating of 16. The probability 
and potential impact index can be applied to both individual and organizational risk 
types. 
 
Figure 6. Probability and Potential Impact Index. 
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Once the type and level of risk have been established, it is evaluated to determine 
if it is a potential homeland security risk. 
B. RISK REVIEW: INDIVIDUAL VS ORGANIZATIONAL 
1. Individual Risk 
Individual risk involves scenarios in which the sensor data loss primarily impacts 
specific individuals or those closest to them. In these cases, the data loss may result in a 
negative impact, but the result is localized to a smaller group. For example, as previously 
discussed in this thesis, the sale of real-time location data can have adverse consequences 
for many individuals; bounty hunters can more easily locate their targets and stalkers may 
locate individuals who prefer to keep their locations private. However, the probability of 
a bad actor purchasing this data varies based on the individual user. According to the 
Motherboard investigation, the now-defunct company CerCareOne, which purchased 
location data from telecom companies, would charge up to $1,100 for a single 
smartphone location.135 Bail bondsmen and bounty hunters may not balk at the price, as 
evidenced by the investigation, but it may act as a deterrent for simple curiosity seekers, 
which results in a relatively low risk factor for the average user. For example, based on 
the risk level chart, an individual at risk of location by a bail bondsman may rate the 
probability of the location data being purchased at a slightly high probability with a 
resulting high impact. In which case, the risk level scores a 9 (Figure 7). However, an 
individual with no bonds and no risk of location by a bail bondsman rates the probability 
of location data being purchased at no probability with a result of no impact. The risk 
level score in that instance is a 0 (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Probability and Potential Impact Index Examples. 
In comparison, the loss of passwords or PINs may result in identify theft, which 
results in a potentially expensive, time-consuming process for users. While Shumailov et 
al. found that side-channel attacks on smartphones are not yet able to identify what users 
are typing 100 percent of the time, they are able to utilize a number of different 
smartphone sensors to identify keystrokes correctly a large percentage of the time and 
will conceivably continue to improve their algorithms, especially as technology continues 
to improve.136 Based on the potential for financial gain, the level of risk rates higher on 
the probability scale and has the potential for a higher level of impact on the individual. 
Both examples contain an element of risk for both privacy and security at the 
individual level; however, neither scenario produces an impact rising to the level of 
organizational risk. Individual users can determine the level of their risk based on the 
probability of the incident occurring and how much impact it can have. It should be noted 
that a scenario identified as an individual risk does not necessarily preclude it from also 
being identified as an organizational risk; depending on the individual or data involved, it 
can also conceivably be considered an organizational risk.  
2. Organizational Risk 
Organizational risk is defined by scenarios that have the ability to impact an 
institution, such as a corporation, governmental agency, or other organized entity. With 
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the increased usage of smartphones in the workplace, both personal and company issued, 
employers face an increased risk that data aggregation from smartphone sensors will 
compromise their privacy and security. In the recent 2019 Verizon Mobile Security Index 
report, 67 percent of the approximately 700 organizations surveyed indicated that they 
were “less confident about the security of their mobile assets than other devices” and 80 
percent indicated that mobile threats are growing faster.137 Despite this concern, the 
report showed that while organizations were cognizant of the potential threats, 48 percent 
stated that they “sacrificed security to ‘get the job done.’”138 This relinquishment is a 
concerning issue, as the same report indicates that 33 percent of organizations 
experienced a compromise related to a mobile device and 62 percent of those 
organizations indicated that those compromises were “major”; across all industries, 75 
percent of the compromises included data loss.139  
In one example referencing the telecommunication companies selling customer 
location data to third parties, while the organization’s data was deliberately sold, 
customers were unaware and did not consent to the action; therefore, although it was a 
conscious decision on the companies’ part, the resulting consumer backlash resulted in a 
risk to the organizations’ reputation. In this scenario, when utilizing the risk level chart, 
companies may determine the risk not on the probability of malicious or inadvertent data 
exposure, but on the probability that consumer backlash negatively impacts profits and 
reputation. In which case, if judged to have an average probability of negative consumer 
backlash with a very high impact (as in the telecommunications example), the 
organizational risk rates an 8. 
Referring back to the example of lost passwords or PINS, a possible scenario 
where the risk shifts from individual to organizational is if the password or PIN lost 
related to an organizational account (i.e., an administrator’s account in a bank). Armed 
with an administrator’s login credentials, a bad actor can infiltrate the organization’s 
network and access sensitive files including trade secrets, employee data, customer data, 
                                                 




or financial information. The loss or exposure of this type of data impacts an organization 
greatly. This scenario is not unlikely, as the Verizon report indicates that 38 percent of 
organizations are most concerned about employees as the source of data loss or exposure 
(the highest percentage) and 51 percent of identified bad actors in the last year 
increasingly targeted mobile devices along with computers.140  
These examples show the types of risks that organizations are facing on an 
increasing basis as industries become progressively dependent on digital technology. 
Organizations are increasingly providing their employees with smartphones or allowing 
bring your own device (BYOD) programs; nevertheless, the numbers show that less than 
19 percent of organizations established a comprehensive acceptable use policy (AUP) 
that outlines the policies and guidelines employees must agree to follow to be granted 
access to organizational networks and data.141 AUPs are an essential part of an 
organization’s cybersecurity, as it ensures employees know what they can and cannot do 
on the network, allows for consistent security protocols, and provides a framework for 
correcting inappropriate behavior. Additionally, organizations are facing threats due to 
outdated smartphone OSs. According to Wandera statistics, 57 percent of Android 
devices are not using the most current operating system and are lagging by at least two 
versions, with an average of 507 identified vulnerabilities; in contrast, 67 percent of 
iPhone operating system (iOS) smartphones have an OS version less than six months old 
and still have an average of 17 identified vulnerabilities.142 The failure to address known 
security issues by timely updating OSs leaves organizations’ data critically exposed. 
Organizations can utilize the probability and potential impact index to determine their 
level of risk and prioritize issues as needed. 





C. HOMELAND SECURITY RISK 
1. Defining Homeland Security 
The homeland security enterprise (HSE) is complex and ever changing; while 
many scholars have attempted to define exactly what homeland security encompasses, no 
official definition exists. In his article “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland 
Security?” Christopher Bellavita identifies seven different definitions for homeland 
security that emphasize different perspectives, including national security.143 His 
definition for national security states, “Homeland security is an element of national 
security that works with other instruments of national power to protect the sovereignty, 
territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure of the U.S. against threats and 
aggression.”144 Based on the data being reviewed, for purposes of this thesis, a homeland 
security risk is defined as any smartphone sensor data loss or exposure scenario with the 
potential to impact the ability of the United States to protect itself against any threats or 
aggression towards its sovereignty, territory, domestic population, or critical 
infrastructure. 
2. Applying the Framework 
Smartphone sensor data scenarios rise to the level of a homeland security risk 
when the data can be used to impact national security. Considering the Strava example 
discussed earlier, while individual user data was exposed, the aggregation of millions of 
data points allowed organizational patterns to emerge, including military information. 
The data exposure impacted individuals (in revealing patterns in their locations), 
organizations (in revealing sensitive personnel movement patterns and building 
locations), and homeland security (by revealing details of military bases and secret 
installations).145 
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In another example, over 100 smartphones owned by soldiers in the Israel 
Defense Force (IDF) were infected by malware.146 The malicious app included code that 
allowed hackers to access data on the smartphones and control different sensors; hackers 
were able to record video and audio, use the camera to take photos and screenshots, and 
read text messages.147 According to the IDF, the attack was aimed at gathering data 
related to IDF tactics and equipment, ground force distribution, and intelligence 
gathering.148 Based on the type of data exposed and the personnel it belonged to, it would 
be classified as a homeland security risk. Both examples involved sensitive data that 
could have adversely impacted military operations. 
Once a scenario has been classified as a homeland security risk, the threat profile 
can be determined by calculating the probability and potential impact index for all three 
threat types: individual, organizational, and homeland security, as seen in Figure 8. Once 
calculated, the scores can be added to the threat profile chart to determine where the 
threat has the highest combined probability and impact. This chart provides a holistic 
overview of the potential impacted parties and possible levels of engagement; the threat 
profile data can be fed into a diagram that shows areas of overlapping concern. 
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Figure 8. Threat Profile Chart and Diagram. 
As an example, the Strava incident has been given probability and potential 
impact ratings based on the three different threat types. The threat profile chart indicates 
that the highest threat is towards homeland security, but individual and organizational 
levels of threat are also represented, as depicted in Figure 9. The diagram identifies how 
closely the threat impact may overlap, which suggests that a level of coordination or 
communication between all three should be initiated to address all threat vectors 
properly. This level of coordination or communication can be accomplished through 
continued communication between all parties (e.g., Strava, Strava users, and impacted 
installations) on any known malicious use of the exposed data or updates on mitigation 
and future prevention actions. Figure 9 illustrates this scenario, wherein a score derived 
from Figure 7 is placed into each threat category. In this instance, the highest score is 
associated with homeland security. 
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Figure 9. Strava Threat Profile Example. 
D. EVALUATING SMARTPHONE SENSOR THREAT VECTORS FOR THE 
HSE 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published a Study on Mobile 
Device Security in 2017 in conjunction with the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. The report 
acknowledged the need to focus on developing policies and protocols for mobile device 
security, as “the default level of security is optimized for consumer ease of use, which is 
not appropriate for Federal employees.”149 The report went on to state that it was possible 
that government mobile users were more likely to be the target of threats due to the 
nature of their work.  
This opinion appears to be supported by the 2019 Verizon Public Sector report, 
which specifically addresses data for federal, state, and local government entities. The 
report indicates that 80 percent of the mobile breaches experienced by the public sector 
included data loss (compared to 75 percent across other industries).150 Additionally, the 
report showed that while 51 percent of the public sector had an acceptable use policy in 
                                                 
149 “DHS S&T Study on Mobile Device Security,” Department of Homeland Security, April 2017, 
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/mobile-device-security-study. 
150 “Verizon Mobile Security Index 2019—Public Sector,” Verizon, February 2019, https://enter 
prise.verizon.com/solutions/public-sector/.  
Individual Threat
Data loss will primarily impact 
specific individuals or those close 




Data loss will impact the ability of 
a country to protect against 
threats towards sovereignty, 





Data loss will impact an institution, 
such as a corporation, 









place, compared to less than 19 percent across other sectors, only 12 percent rated their 
employees as “highly knowledgeable in mobile security,” the lowest of all sectors.151  
While the data loss or exposure of high profile, high priority individual targets 
may rise to the level of a homeland security risk, in general, homeland security risks tend 
to come from organizational data loss and data aggregation because they can provide a 
wealth of information that can be used to create actionable intelligence. Smartphone 
sensor datasets aggregated from public sector employees can reveal a variety of sensitive 
information, including location data for individuals and building structures, patterns of 
activity for employees and security personnel, relationships among personnel, and 
communication data. Sold datasets or those exposed digitally online can be viewed by 
anyone, from individual bad actors to groups and foreign states. This level of data access 
increases the situational awareness of adversaries in preparing for possible attacks. Any 
data that increases an adversary’s situational awareness must be considered, by 
definition, as a threat to homeland security. 
1. Data Aggregation and Predictive Analytics 
Anonymized datasets are frequently published online for research and data mining 
purposes; by removing personally identifiable information, such as names, dates of birth, 
and addresses, many believe that the data has been adequately anonymized and is safe to 
upload online. However, by comparing and correlating the anonymized dataset with other 
publicly available datasets, user data can be linked to specific individuals. In their paper, 
Narayana and Shmatikov outline models on how to de-anonymize datasets by providing 
an analysis of the Netflix Prize dataset.152 The Netflix Prize dataset included over one 
hundred million anonymized movie ratings of approximately 500,000 users and was 
published as part of Netflix’s data mining contest. By utilizing their algorithms and other 
publicly available data (i.e., IMDb, an online repository for movie and television 
content), Narayan and Shmatikov were able to not only identify individual users, but also 
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aggregate their data to create profiles of the individuals they identified.153 These types of 
datasets circulate the internet and are impossible to remove, as copies are made and 
distributed to multiple websites. In 2006, America Online (AOL) published over 658,000 
users’ search histories because it believed them to be anonymized since they replaced 
user identifications (IDs) with unique numbers; however, the search histories themselves 
were so detailed and specific that the internet community identified the users.154 This 
dataset from 2006 is still available today and can be correlated and aggregated with 
current datasets, potentially including the Netflix Prize dataset. 
From a homeland security aspect, these numbers mean that the sheer amount of 
information available online is growing, with the potential for data to be aggregated 
increasing every year. As more and more industries move to a digital format, increasingly 
sensitive information is being stored online; the ability of a bad actor to potentially 
aggregate enough data to generate a complete dossier for a targeted individual or group is 
growing exponentially. This type of information can be used in a variety of ways that 
negatively impacts homeland security. From a physical standpoint, knowing the patterns 
and routines of HSE individuals or groups can compromise physical security, whether by 
identifying HSE locations, exposing HSE movements and patterns for attack, or leading 
to potential kidnappings. Intimate knowledge of an individual’s personal life can also 
lead to blackmail scenarios; bad actors can possess data on sensitive health issues or 
habits, secret relationships, financial issues, and other potentially life altering details that 
can leave an HSE employee susceptible to coercion tactics. 
In addition, by aggregating enough data, predictive analytics can be used to 
analyze user patterns and behavior to predict future behavior. The marketing industry has 
developed sophisticated algorithms to analyze and predict consumer behavior based on 
tracking their actions online; the algorithms have been refined to the point that companies 
can successfully target and manipulate consumer-purchasing habits.155 In the same way, 
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bad actors can utilize predictive analytics to predict future actions of individuals or 
organizational groups in the HSE. Next, they can use the data to stage attacks or 
manipulate behavior. In the Strava example, the release of the dataset revealed personal 
information about individuals’ fitness habits that included their names, locations, speeds, 
workout type, and in some instances, their military rank.156 The Strava data revealed 
users’ most frequented routes; for many military users, patrol routes, base perimeters, and 
remote outposts were revealed. By identifying this information, a bad actor can access the 
location of a military installation, and know the general movements of the defenders, as 
well as specific names of individuals and their habits. 
Based on this, data aggregation and predictive analytics pose a serious threat to 
homeland security, as it provides a wealth of data that can be used to create tactical and 
strategic advantages, especially if it is unknown that the data has been collected. The 
HSE must constantly assess how much information is becoming available online and how 
the correlation of that data can be used to target specific HSE entities. The probability 
and potential impact index can be used to assess the threat and determine focus areas for 
remediation. 
2. Direct Sensor Access and Control 
As a result of data aggregation, malware, or targeted attacks, another threat vector 
relates to the undetected hijacking and direct control of smartphone sensors. By gaining 
control of these sensors, bad actors have the ability to spy on users freely to gather data 
on their communications, location, physical and cyber environments, and networks. This 
data collection presents a clear risk for the HSE, as highly sensitive data and networks 
then become accessible to bad actors.  
Referring back to the IDF example in which soldiers were specifically targeted, 
malware was installed on their smartphones that allowed the remote control of onboard 
sensors.157 The malware allowed bad actors to “read text messages, access the contacts 
list, take pictures and screenshots, eavesdrop at specific times of the day, and record 
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video and audio.”158 This attack and data collection would have provided actionable 
intelligence regarding individual soldier’s movements, troop deployments and tactics, 
and a direct vector for infiltrating the IDF networks. 
Another potential area in which direct control may have critical consequences lies 
in the increasing internet of things (IoT). According to Khera, the IoT is expected to 
include over 25 billion devices by 2020, many of which can be controlled by 
smartphones.159 The possibility that hackers can take over many of the devices used in 
daily life can be alarming, which is especially true as more medical devices depend on 
connections to the internet; many studies have been conducted to analyze the safety and 
security of those devices. Khera points to Jay Radcliffe’s presentation at the 2011 Black 
Hat USA security conference, where he demonstrated that insulin pumps could be 
remotely controlled to deliver lethal doses of insulin.160 In another example, Barnaby 
Jack, another presenter at Black Hat in 2012, demonstrated that a laptop could issue a 
command to a pacemaker from 50 feet away and potentially deliver a fatal shock.161 With 
their current capabilities, smartphones can replicate the same results. 
This threat vector requires active monitoring to maximize prevention and increase 
detection abilities to minimize data loss. Based on the ease of installing malware on 
smartphones, this vector has a high probability and very high impact index; threats of this 
nature require focused attention and resources from the HSE and its leadership. 
3. Data Theft or Manipulation 
The theft of sensitive data is one of the most common risks because of either or 
both previous vectors. Bad actors may target a variety of secure datasets they may 
otherwise be unable to access any other way. An example of this threat vector was the 
embedded malware in the Android OS found in certain Chinese manufactured 
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smartphones. The infected phones were found to be “clandestinely collecting and 
transmitting troves of user personal data and device use data, including text messages 
(ultra-powered with keyword targeting), contacts, call history (including phone numbers), 
app use, unique IMSI and IMEI numbers for the SIM card and the phone itself… and 
even reprogramming the phones entirely.”162  
In addition to stealing data, bad actors who have been able to breach the system 
may also manipulate the data and compromise data integrity for sensitive datasets, which 
is particularly concerning if the data theft or manipulation remains undetected for long 
periods. For example, in June 2015, OPM announced that its database had been breached 
and resulted in the theft of the sensitive information of 21.5 million individuals, including 
extensive background investigation records, fingerprints, and top secret security 
clearance applications.163 While the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) databases 
had not yet been linked to the intelligence community’s (IC’s) sensitive clearance 
databases, Finklea et al. state: 
If the IC’s database were linked with OPM’s, this could potentially help 
the hackers gain access to intelligence agency personnel and identify 
clandestine and covert officers. Even if data on intelligence agency 
personnel were not compromised, the hackers might be able to use the 
sensitive personnel information to “neutralize” U.S. officials by exploiting 
their personal weaknesses and/or targeting their relatives abroad. Access 
to the IC’s database could also reveal the process and criteria for gaining 
clearances and special access, allowing foreign agents to more easily 
infiltrate the U.S. government.164 
It should also be noted that while the breach was identified by OPM in 2015, further 
investigation showed that the breach may have occurred as early as 2012, which did 
potentially allow bad actors to manipulate and alter OPM records for over three years 
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undetected.165 This access had the possibility of allowing Chinese intelligence, the 
suspected culprit, to insert covert operatives directly into the federal system.  
While the OPM breach is the most far-reaching example to date of data theft and 
possible manipulation, the Verizon report indicates that 80 percent of public sector 
mobile breaches involved lost data; therefore, this area of concentration is critical for the 
HSE.166 The DHS report indicates that government smartphones potentially provide a 
way to breach systems that house data on millions of Americans and other sensitive 
government information, with threats ranging from “advanced nation state attacks, to 
organized crime using advanced fraud technologies, to simple theft of mobile phones.”167 
The report indicates that based on the current and projected levels of threat, the HSE must 
take steps to identify and mitigate mobile security risks. 
E. WHAT IF: IMAGINING A POTENTIAL WORST CASE SCENARIO 
The potential homeland security threat from smartphone sensor data is fairly 
defined within the different vectors. However, to cover the potential scope and magnitude 
of a planned attack fully, the following scenario makes use of the different sensor 
capabilities previously covered and includes all threat vectors.  
It is 10 years in the future. A devastating attack has been successfully launched 
against the Pentagon and the Capitol building, as well as financial institutions and critical 
infrastructure; the ability of unknown state actors to pull off such a coordinated attack 
and compromise such highly secured structures has shaken the confidence of the 
American public. In addition, as the energy and financial industries struggle to recover, 
the DC community is trying to rebuild. The intelligence community and the HSE are 
working to unravel how the attack was coordinated and executed. Meanwhile, the media 
outlets are rife with speculation and blame; social media is littered with conspiracy 
theories that blame corrupt or incompetent leadership across the board. As the IC and 
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HSE delve deeper, they uncover the largest data breach to date and reveal a plot filled 
with blackmail, manipulation, and assassinations. 
1. Year One: Infection and Surveillance 
They came in ones and twos, some flying directly into Washington, DC and 
others into major cities within the area. Over the course of a few weeks, they settled 
within the DC area, began setting up free wireless networking protocol (Wi-Fi) access 
points, and then scattered them throughout coffee shops, parks, and popular restaurants. 
As users automatically accepted the terms and conditions to connect, malware was 
quietly downloaded to their smartphones. Running unobtrusively in the background, the 
malware began immediately collecting all available data and routing it to a predetermined 
website at regular intervals. From a remote location far from the heart of DC, another 
team waited and watched the dots appear on a map, which indicated another infected 
smartphone going live.  
Over the course of the next several weeks, hundreds of dots would appear, then 
thousands, as the malware continued to spread; some from direct connections to the Wi-
Fi points and others through smartphone to smartphone transmission via Bluetooth, email 
attachments, or messaging. The malware was insidious, and infected government 
employees, private sector employees, local residents, and tourists alike in the DC area. As 
the numbers approached a saturation point, the DC team removed the initial Wi-Fi access 
points, went about their business, and waited for further instructions. 
As the data collection continued, the remote team tracked each unique 
smartphone’s location, compared the data to residential and rental datasets, and 
eventually correlated the smartphones to specific individuals based on where the phones 
spent the majority of their nights. Multiple smartphone signatures reporting to a single 
residential location were sorted out by adding in employment and student information 
retrieved from employer and school datasets (e.g., employer websites, professional 
networking sites, public databases, university pages, and social media). With the 
smartphones linked to individuals, the team began scouring the database for individuals 
connected to the government, and specifically tagged politicians, military members, 
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critical infrastructure personnel, financial employees, and members of the intelligence 
community. 
Within that relatively smaller pool of individuals, the team began aggregating the 
information with additional datasets, including voting and poll information, medical 
histories, financial status, internet search histories, and a listing of their closest associates, 
based on both frequency of physical and digital interactions. By correlating this 
information, the team generated individualized profiles for each person and then flagged 
those who had behaviors favorable to their objectives and those who could pose potential 
barriers. Narrowing the list further to both sets of individuals, they performed a deep dive 
into the data associated with them to identify possible weaknesses that could be exploited 
and leveraged. To gain additional insight, the remote team activated another aspect of the 
embedded malware that turned on smartphone sensors to take photos, videos, and sound 
recordings discretely of individuals of interest and those around them. These 
smartphones, when connected to government or corporate networks, left behind 
additional targeted malware. 
After months of intense surveillance and capturing the patterns of movement 
within the DC area, the remote team finalized their targets and instructions, and then 
notified the DC team. 
2. Year Two: Infiltration and Social Engineering 
A year had passed, and the DC team settled into their roles in the DC area, some 
as full- or part-time employees within local businesses or as small business owners. As 
they received updated instructions, they began executing phase two of the operation. 
Establishing themselves in their communities, some bought residences and small 
businesses, and also purchased repair shops, warehouses, and storage facilities. Some 
made immediate contact with their targets by beginning new friendships or establishing 
valuable business connections. Others insinuated themselves into their targets’ routines 
by using the data collected to befriend family members and become the ideal confidante. 
A few applied for new positions of employment to position themselves within 
organizations for even more access. Some recruited different types of assets by 
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identifying those who were depressed or isolated, based on their communication patterns, 
and groomed them for potential future use.  
Throughout it all, they continued to receive frequent updates from the remote 
team and relied on the stream of data to keep them situationally aware of the impact of 
their actions and also provided their own feedback. 
3. Years Three and Four: Setting the Stage 
It started small. The news article was buried on page 12 and drew relatively little 
attention. The story reported that the influential chief executive officer (CEO) of a large 
financial institution died due to complications resulting from an accidental overdose from 
his implanted insulin device. His death triggered a review of the safety of such devices, 
but a new CEO was selected and the investigation eventually came back as inconclusive. 
No information surfaced regarding his email communications with his cybersecurity 
advisor, who he had tasked to follow up on unusual activity within the network. With his 
death, the new CEO focused on realigning the team and brought in his own cybersecurity 
advisor. During the transition, the previous investigation was deemed to be low priority 
and dropped. As time passed, leadership structures throughout the financial industry were 
discretely modified to promote those who were less prone to push for more stringent 
security requirements. 
Monitoring the text messages and online activity between a group of individuals 
whose identifies were matched as having terrorist ties, one of the team members made 
contact. Masquerading as a member of the organization, he gradually built a connection 
with the group and organized them into a local terrorist cell to prepare for an eventual 
attack.  
Over the next two years, several politicians and leaders throughout the DC area 
were targeted for removal, due to their political stances or ability to impact long-term 
operations. A few were removed quietly, either through low level blackmail or 
assassinations covered up as medical issues or random violent events. Some resigned 
voluntarily over the exposure of personal information that went viral over social media. 
Others were forced to resign, as news outlets received anonymous information regarding 
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financial issues or screenshots of controversial statements from private accounts. While 
reputations were made or shredded, the focus shifted to data and privacy breaches due to 
lax security protocols and lone hackers; though privacy and security advocates pushed for 
stronger regulations and controls, the general public appeared resigned to the ongoing 
revelations. A few conspiracy theorists blamed the government itself for manipulating the 
public, while a few laid the blame at industry insiders manipulating the system for 
financial gain.  
With the ability to harvest massive amounts of what amounted to live situational 
data unobtrusively, the remote team settled in for the long term, manipulated individuals 
and situations as opportunities arose, and gradually removed and installed potential key 
players throughout significant industries and offices. By analyzing social media 
responses, they were able to shift or reinforce public sentiment by releasing thousands of 
bots, posing as concerned citizens, to promote their message.  
At the end of the fourth year of operations, the remote team received contact from 
their chain of command. Political negotiations had stalled again and tensions between the 
country and the United States had escalated beyond previous levels. With the increasing 
calls for military action and the pressure on the international stage, the United States had 
to be neutralized or eliminated as a potential threat. The command was given to initiate 
phase three. 
4. Year Five: End Game 
It is a busy Tuesday morning. A minor accident has caused a slight traffic jam, 
and the four men in a non-descript sedan are impatient to be moving. They have received 
instructions from their contact, who they believe to be part of their terrorist cell, that the 
attack will take place today. They make their way to the West Point Military Academy, 
and ensure their smartphones are fully charged so that their contact can track their 
movements and coordinate with them. As they walk onto the campus, carrying athletic 
bags, they stop by the restroom and arm themselves. Receiving the signal from their 
contact, they step out and begin shooting and spread out to maximize the damage. 
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From their location, the remote team keeps an eye on the media outlets and waits 
for the first signs of reaction. They are tracking the terrorists’ movements and can see the 
exact moment when the flow of location data shifts from a normal pattern to chaos. As 
smartphones identified as local law enforcement begin moving towards the Academy, the 
team reviews movements closer to DC. With the attack on the Academy, military leaders 
are en route to the Pentagon. As the media outlets explode with breaking coverage, the 
team sends a command and activates dormant malware programs within the financial 
industry; financial institutions are thrown into disarray as they lose control of their 
automated trading and financial systems. Within minutes, they receive ransom demands 
for millions of dollars via bitcoin by anonymous hackers. Tied up by the active shooter 
coverage, the media is slow to report this news, but the remote team is monitoring their 
communication network, aware that the industry is working on damage control. News of 
the financial cyber-attack floods social media as users tweet complaints about not being 
able to access their funds. The growing panic initiates an emergency meeting of the 
Senate and members begin making their way to the Capitol building.  
It is close to noon and top military leaders have been handling the Academy 
response in the Pentagon, coordinating resources and trying to identify possible sources 
and motives. At the Capitol building, senators have mostly arrived and are working with 
aides to sort through incoming reports from the financial industry and panicked 
constituents. As another senator arrives and is logged as being at the Capitol building, an 
algorithm identifies that at least 60 percent of flagged smartphones are now located either 
at the Pentagon or Capitol building and sends an alert to the DC team. Receiving a text, 
specific members of the DC team launch a swarm of small, explosives armed drones that 
are released from the warehouses and storage units in which they have been housed. 
Honing in on the smartphone locations of their designated targets, the drones fly in low, 
which are destined for either the Pentagon or the Capitol. Not all of them will make it, 
and each carries a relatively small amount of explosives, but they number in the hundreds 
and they can track their targets. 
As the first of the drones begin to smash and detonate against the Pentagon and 
Capitol building, some make it through the windows and streak through the building and 
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cause mass panic and chaos. At first, the attack seems organized and coordinated, as the 
targets are clustered together within meeting rooms, but as panic spreads and individuals 
attempt to evacuate, the drones split to follow their targets. Some begin to detonate in the 
same place, as smartphones are dropped or casualties increase, which results in more 
damage in those areas. Watching the smartphone movements stall within the Pentagon 
and Capitol building, the DC team prepares to set off a series of explosions designed to 
limit the capabilities of first responders. Clustered in a distant apartment, they monitor 
their equipment and watch as police cars, ambulances, and fire trucks race to the attack 
sites. On another screen, a few dots follow the same route, which indicates specific 
individuals with compromised smartphones. As the dots come within 10 feet of 
previously implanted explosive devices under bridges and underpasses, the smartphones 
send out a signal and detonate the devices. Explosions echo through the city and cause 
massive traffic jams and panic as people abandon their vehicles and flee the streets, 
which hampers the efforts of response teams further. 
Across the country, power generating stations and substations suffer either 
physical or cyber-attacks that affect approximately 20 percent of the power grid across 
the United States, which causes massive blackouts and further disruption. Additionally, in 
the ensuing chaos, special operations teams, armed with the specific locations of their 
targets, successfully assassinate a number of key business, government, and civic leaders 
in large urban centers. As the country scrambles to make sense of these terrifying events 
and respond, team members vanish in the chaos, assisted by operatives previously 
inserted via falsified records. With the blame initially laid on a well-known terrorist 
organization, the remote team is able to continue monitoring for quite some time and 
hides their tracks, which leaves a complicated digital trail that hints at a different state 
actor.  
Weeks later, as the operation comes to a close, they receive another contact from 
their chain of command. The United States has refocused attention to domestic issues and 
is no longer a threat to their objectives on the international stage. The team has been 
given a new assignment and will receive additional information outlining the parameters 
of the next infiltration operation. 
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Although a hypothetical scenario, the capabilities and vulnerabilities of 
smartphone sensors and their data are already well documented; many potential threats 
and possible mitigation strategies have already been advanced. The next chapter provides 
recommendations for mitigating those risks and moving forward. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
In 1998, Will Smith fled from National Security Agency (NSA) agents 
monitoring his movements through a tracking device in his cell phone in the movie 
Enemy of the State. Keanu Reeves was tracked via another cell phone by his colleagues in 
the 1999 movie The Matrix. In The Bourne Ultimatum, released in 2007, Matt Damon 
tracked an assassin using the GPS on his phone. In all three movies, time was wasted as 
characters tried to comprehend how they were being tracked; all three movies came out 
before smartphones and their GPS capabilities became ubiquitous. At the time, audiences 
may have felt some disquiet at the thought of being so easily surveilled, or perhaps they 
scoffed at the idea that such technology was believable; in some instances, some may not 
have given it another thought, other than commenting on its use as a plot driver. Today, 
smartphones are everywhere and audiences are more prone to see such scenarios as 
realistic instead of part of the movie magic that drives the story. Plotlines are now 
peppered with paranoid characters who worry about being surveilled by their 
smartphones and are seen throwing them out car windows or tossing them in trashcans as 
they prepare to “go off the grid.” Considering the capabilities of the sensors reviewed in 
previous chapters, it is easy to see why they have a cause for concern. This chapter 
identifies recommendations to mitigate risks and discuss a way forward. 
Based on the information covered in this thesis, it is apparent that smartphone 
sensor data, especially when aggregated, poses an increasing risk to not only individual 
and organizational privacy and security, but also homeland security. As previously noted, 
while privacy rights and data security concerns are becoming increasingly spotlighted 
across the globe, regulations and policies on data privacy and security are still in their 
infancy, where they exist at all. They are also scattered and vary widely on what they 
cover, which results in an inconsistent patchwork of rules that are difficult to enforce; this 
enforcement is only complicated more when data issues cross national boundaries. 
In addition, while some exploration and effort to holding smartphone 
manufacturers, telecommunication companies, and app developers accountable for 
providing some level of privacy and data security has started, without established 
64 
regulations or policies to outline potential consequences, taking proactive steps to address 
these issues is largely contingent upon the companies and developers, who must balance 
security and privacy with profit. Considering that their reputations impact sales, 
smartphone manufacturers and telecommunication companies have a higher incentive to 
provide some level of security. However, even if a majority of app developers takes on 
the task of creating more secure apps with transparent terms and conditions, a large 
number will not. According to International Business Machines (IBM), during a time 
frame of seven days, they identified over 18,000 new apps (7,000 Android and 11,000 
iOS), which leaves app-based risks relatively high.168  
Based on this data, individuals, organizations, and the HSE must evaluate their 
own privacy and data security needs and take action to mitigate the risks themselves. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Individual Users 
Based on the research, individual users can take a variety of actions to protect 
their privacy and data security better. This protection is particularly critical for 
individuals within the HSE, as government and private industry reports show that they 
have a higher risk profile for targeted attacks in comparison to the general public. Users 
should take the time to understand the capabilities of their smartphones better; by 
understanding how their smartphones work and what privacy and security options are 
available, users can modify their settings appropriately and make informed decisions 
about connecting to internet sources and other devices.  
Reading and understanding the terms and conditions is also an important factor. 
While terms and conditions are not always clear and transparent, users may be able to 
identify potential flags if they see requests to access sensors that are not normally utilized 
for that type of app. Wandera, a mobile security company, found that 12 percent of 
Android apps request to “modify system settings” and 90 percent ask for “full network 
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access.”169 Users should carefully consider the utility and convenience of an app in 
relation to the potential risks. 
Users should also consider what type of apps they are downloading and whether 
downloaded apps are still being used. Since data collection can happen while apps are in 
the background, many users are unaware that apps they no longer use are still collecting 
their sensor data. By minimizing the number of apps on their smartphone, users can 
minimize the amount of data collected and reported. In addition, users should refrain 
from downloading apps from unauthorized platforms, which may not have as rigorous a 
screening process as authorized app stores. 
OSs are frequently updated to address security issues and protocols; users should 
make sure to install updates as they are released. Smartphone owners who fail to install 
updates regularly expose themselves to identified security loopholes and thus increase 
their risk. 
2. Organizations 
Besides ensuring that their employees are aware of the individual steps they can 
take to secure their smartphones, organizations can work towards meeting the minimum 
industry standards for mobile security. For example, the Verizon report identified four 
basic security policies: regularly testing security systems, restricting access on an as 
needed basis, changing default passwords, and encrypting sensitive data on public 
networks; surprisingly, only 12 percent of organizations followed all four policies, which 
was two percent less than 2018.170 In addition, less than 50 percent of organizations have 
implemented mobile security solutions for more than a year, Table 2, including device 
enrollment programs, DLP, and anti-malware.171  
 





Table 2. Adoption Percentage of Key Mobile Security Solutions.172 
 
 
DLP policies refer to strategies used to ensure that users are aware of what 
information can be sent outside the organization’s network; in some instances, network 
administrators can utilize software products to control data transfers.173 Administrators 
can identify sensitive or classified information and prevent users from sending or 
uploading the data, whether intentionally or not.174 DEPs allow administrators to 
configure and setup smartphones automatically to preconfigured organizational standards 
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to allow for consistency in security protocols across the organization.175 Anti-malware 
are software programs that prevent, identify, and eliminate malware on systems and 
devices by using signature detection, sandboxing, and behavior detection.176 Signature 
detection identifies known malware signatures as defined in a database; behavior based 
detection does not depend on a preset definition, but instead utilizes machine learning to 
determine if behavior can be classified as malicious.177 In sandboxing, anti-malware will 
segregate applications to ensure that they are clean; if the anti-malware detects suspicious 
behavior, it will end the program.178 By implementing these types of policies, 
organizations can reduce their level of risk. 
3. Homeland Security Enterprise 
In addition to implementing the recommendations outlined at the individual and 
organizational levels, the HSE as a whole needs to exercise even more vigilance towards 
mobile security threats, as the probability of attack and the potential impact are much 
greater. In implementing the recommendations, the HSE must ensure it meets the 
minimum requirements of mobile security and take steps to exceed them. While ease of 
use should be considered, it should not supersede potential security risks. For example, 
while organizations may endorse BYOD programs to capitalize on lower equipment costs 
and increase convenience for employees, organizations in the HSE may consider the cost 
of the smartphones as an investment in security. By providing smartphones for their 
employees, organizations have more control over the security settings, apps installed, and 
system updates; DEPs can also be fully implemented. Other areas that need enhanced 
policy and regulation include stronger and more consistent acceptable use policies, data 
and rights management, and the identification of mobile device exclusion zones within 
secure or sensitive facilities. 
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Another potential avenue for research and improvement would be to have 
DARPA initiate a project on data anonymity. Modeled after the TOR project, the 
DARPA initiative would focus on anonymizing smartphone usage to allow users to 
continue to benefit from the use of smartphone sensors while significantly increasing 
their level of anonymity. Like TOR, it would be voluntary for the public, but allow users 
the option to choose anonymity. For those in the HSE, usage may be mandated based on 
the level of perceived risk to potentially mitigate the source of data; instead of 
anonymizing datasets that can later be de-anonymized, utilizing a form of TOR for sensor 
data can minimize data aggregation to begin with.179  
In addition, the HSE must invest on improving its workforce’s knowledge of 
mobile security and cybersecurity. With the large number of public sector data breaches, 
regardless of the involvement of smartphones, it is crucial that HSE employees have the 
knowledge and training needed to protect the data for which they are responsible. In the 
aftermath of 9/11, the DHS made a big push on the “See Something, Say Something” 
campaign; a commensurate effort should be directed towards highlighting the importance 
of mobile security to increase awareness amongst individuals, organizations, and the 
HSE. 
B. CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of 9/11 and after extensive review, the 9/11 Commission Report 
included a statement from the committee that stated, “We believe the 9/11 attacks 
revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.”180 
With the amount of research available regarding the potential use of smartphone sensors 
across multiple industries, positive and negative, and the rising tide of concern over 
privacy and security issues, it does not appear that a lack of imagination exists among the 
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general public or the privacy and security community regarding possible homeland 
security threats from the misuse of smartphone sensor data. Instead, based on the 
information covered, it seems that the potential for failure lies in the areas of policy, 
capabilities, and management. While the recommendations listed in this thesis are a 
starting point for individuals, organizations, and the HSE, smartphone sensor data will 
continue to pose shifting privacy and national security risks. To address the issue 
effectively, consideration must be given to the other three issues raised in the 9/11 
Commission Report: policy, capabilities, and management.  
Regarding policy, the report states that the road to 9/11 “illustrates how the large, 
unwieldy U.S. government tended to underestimate a threat that grew ever greater.”181 
This scenario is echoed today as privacy advocates and data security experts continue to 
raise the alarm on the growing security threat of smartphone sensor data collection and 
aggregation. Meanwhile, policies and regulations lag behind the explosive growth of 
technology and the resulting exponential growth of easily acquired datasets. Industries, 
regulators, and the HSE struggle with how to apply dated privacy and security protocols 
on emerging issues. Policies and regulations must be drafted to create a more 
comprehensive mobile privacy and security strategy that includes the HSE, regulatory 
bodies, manufacturers, telecommunication carriers, developers, and other stakeholders.  
The 9/11 report provided the following insight regarding capabilities, “Before 
9/11, the United States tried to solve the al Qaeda problem with the same government 
institutions and capabilities that it had used in the last stages of the Cold War and its 
immediate aftermath. These capabilities were insufficient but little was done to expand or 
reform them.”182 The report continues to state that government agencies “are often 
passive, accepting what are viewed as givens, including that efforts to identify and fix 
glaring vulnerabilities to dangerous threats would be too costly, too controversial, or too 
disruptive.183 Data breaches have become increasingly common and media reports of 
malware infecting smartphones have become a frequent occurrence. It will become 
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increasingly costly to continue to ignore vulnerabilities in mobile security. Capabilities 
must be assessed to ensure that they are up to the task of preventing, monitoring, 
identifying, and resolving privacy and security issues as they emerge.  
In terms of management, the 9/11 report indicated “various missed opportunities 
to thwart the 9/11 plot… Often the handoffs of information were lost across the divide 
separating the foreign and domestic agencies of the government… we believe they are 
symptoms of the government’s broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to the 
new challenges of the twenty-first century.”184 To avoid reprising this issue, management 
needs to ensure that they are knowledgeable about the risks involved and the resources 
they have at their disposal to react quickly and make sound decisions. Established 
protocols should be in place so roles and responsibilities in threat reporting are clear and 
consistent. In addition, they also need to ensure that their workforce has the necessary 
training and knowledge about mobile security and a thorough understanding of when and 
how to report threats.  
Smartphones have become a ubiquitous part of daily life to billions of people; 
their sensors are increasingly being used to assist and enhance even more aspects of 
users’ lives, which require the collection of mass amounts of sensitive datasets to do so. 
In the hands of the wrong individuals, this data has the potential to have long-lasting, far-
reaching consequences for not only individuals and organizations, but to homeland 
security. Action must be taken to mitigate the risk to the maximum extent possible. To 
echo the sentiments of George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, in the 9/11 report, 
the system is blinking red. 
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